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Fiscal policy in the interwar period was a complicated affair. Middleton (2013) highlights this
with reference to the United Kingdom by drawing attention to the “[...] complex of enormous
pressures for expenditure growth, a budget now significantly enlarged from pre-war and highly
cyclically sensitive, and all of this within the context of considerable macroeconomic instability
and the pressures for the Keynesian solution which, importantly, predate the 1929 downturn”.
Other countries faced even more formidable challenges, due to significantly greater economic
instability combined with younger, less centralized and less fiscally endowed states. In fact,
both public revenues and expenditures were extremely volatile in many countries in the interwar
period, and this contributed to overall uncertainty in the economic and political spheres. This
paper engages with the following questions: 1) How did fiscal capacity affect the volatility of tax
revenues and government financing in the interwar period? 2) Through which channels did this
effect occur? I tackle these questions using newly collected data for a large panel of countries
(23 to 29, depending on the specification).
I carry out the empirical analysis in two steps. First, I show that the fiscal capacity of
countries – measured by overall tax revenue and income tax revenue as shares of GDP – played
a major role in reducing the cyclical volatility of government financing. Second, I focus on
the role of fiscal capacity in guaranteeing countries an easier access to borrowing. Specifically,
I show that high capacity countries had higher initial debt stocks, were able to borrow more
compared to low capacity countries in the interwar years, and also had lower sovereign bond
yield spreads, which allowed them to borrow more cheaply. By focusing on the composition
rather than just the magnitude of tax revenues, I provide evidence that these effects were due to
fiscal capacity signaling higher institutional quality, rather than simply a higher present value
of future tax receipts.
(a) Fiscal Capacity=Tax/GDP (b) Fiscal Capacity=IncomeTax/GDP
Figure 1: Government financing and fiscal capacity, 1929-33
Percentage changes in government financing are annual. Countries classified as low (blue) and high (red) ca-
pacity based on whether they are below or above the median of the respective fiscal capacity indicator. Source:
Statistisches Reichsamt for the revenue data and Klasing and Milionis (2014) for the nominal GDP data.
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The main finding of this paper – that is, the link between fiscal capacity and the ability to
smooth government financing – is summarized in Figure 1. This illustrates annual percentage
changes in government financing for the Great Depression years (1929-33) given a country’s
degree of fiscal capacity, measured using taxes as a share of GDP (panel a) and income taxes as
a share of GDP (panel b). Countries are classified as low (in blue) and high (in red) capacity
based on whether they are below or above the median of the respective fiscal capacity indicator.
It is immediately evident that the dispersion of government financing is much larger for low
compared to high capacity countries. In fact the standard deviation for the former is 58 to
34% (depending on which indicator is used) higher than thar of the latter. The analysis below
will demonstrate that this insight is robust to the inclusion of a wide array of controls, non-
linear specifications and an instrumental variable strategy to account for potential bias and
measurement error.1
I deal with the potential endogeneity of fiscal institutions and the confounding effects of
temporary changes in tax policy with two strategies. The first is holding the structure of fiscal
systems stable by using 1914-1926 average fiscal indicators to study changes in government
revenues between 1927 and 1938. The second is an instrumental variable approach. I employ
two instruments for fiscal capacity: 1) the incidence of major external conflicts between 1816
and 1913, as reconstructed by Dincecco and Prado (2012); 2) the long term incidence of natural
disasters, which I calculate based on data from the EM-DAT dataset of the Centre for the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2017). The choice of these variables has historical, theoret-
ical and empirical foundations that are discussed in detail below. In short: external conflicts
facilitate the extension of the state’s franchise because they lead to an increase in the demand
for a public good – national defense – which needs to be financed through taxation. Indeed, the
historical record shows that warfare encouraged reforms, which had far reaching consequences
for the fiscal development of countries. Natural disasters, instead, are a counter-force to the
concentration of fiscal resources in national governments. This is because of their predomi-
nantly small scale, which spurs the creation of targeted local, rather than central, institutions
and revenue streams to deal with their consequences.
This paper speaks to four main strands of literature. First, it addresses the economic
history literature on policy reactions to the Great Depression. Amongst many others, Temin
(1989) and Eichengreen (1992) have pointed out that these were either misguided – in core
countries – or extremely limited – in the periphery. Eichengreen maintained that this was due
to the constraints imposed by the dysfunctional interwar Gold Standard, in conjunction with
weak international cooperation and an inadequate conceptual framework based on balancing
the budget. Temin similarly claimed that the Gold Standard was the key mechanism for the
diffusion and severity of the slump. I argue that the pre-existing structure of fiscal systems
also severely constrained the policy responses of countries that saw their tax revenues collapse
1For example, if countries with more volatile revenues decided to invest more in fiscal capacity to mitigate this,
the effect of the latter would be underestimated in the regressions. Rodrik (1998) discusses the issue of the
co-determinateness of volatility and government size in the context of estimating the effect of openness on
government size, but it could similarly apply in this context. Conversely, if revenue volatility made investments
in fiscal capacity more difficult, the impact of fiscal capacity would be overestimated.
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and financial markets dry up. Moreover, I find that these constraints were more binding for
countries which had left the Gold Standard, making the decision of shedding the golden fetters
potentially endogenous to fiscal capacity. Thus, the Gold Standard straitjacket invoked by the
literature interacted with additional and more-deeply rooted constraints.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the cyclicality of fiscal policy and the lit-
erature on the determinants and impact of macroeconomic volatility. It is now a well-established
stylized fact that, in the post-World War II era, industrialized economies have consistently run
countercyclical or acyclical fiscal policies, while developing countries have followed procyclical
ones, which have presumably contributed to their macroeconomic volatility.2 A further stylized
fact for the post-WWII era is that countries with larger governments tend to have less volatile
economies. This has been attributed to the combination of automatic stabilizers and compo-
sition effects (Gaĺı, 1994; Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Andrés, Doménech, and Fatás, 2008). The
argument for the latter is that the public sector is more stable than the private sector, therefore
countries with larger public sectors will be less volatile overall.
I add an historical dimension to this literature by showing that both government revenue
and expenditure were more volatile than GDP on average in the Great Depression years. Thus,
the historical record, as well as the experience of developing countries today (Mendoza and
Oviedo, 2006), demonstrates that a lower volatility in the public sector compared to the private
sector should not be taken for granted. The paper’s findings also support the notion that
institutionally-determined credit constraints in countries with weak and small governments can
play an important role in fiscal policy pro-cyclicality and volatility. Consequently, the ability
of stronger governments to run more counter-cyclical and less volatile fiscal policies might help
explain the negative correlation between government size and macroeconomic volatility.
Third, my findings shed further light on the far-reaching impact of fiscal institutions on
economic outcomes. The literature linking fiscal capacity to long-term economic development
both theoretically and empirically is now an established and burgeoning field (See Section 2).
However, despite evidence that fiscal development is an important determinant of the ability
to borrow (North and Weingast, 1989; Bordo and White, 1991; Dincecco, 2009; O’Brien, 2011),
there are no empirical studies linking fiscal capacity directly to cyclical economic outcomes and
fiscal policies. This paper helps fill this gap.
The final contribution of the paper is to provide new data on the fiscal history of the
interwar period. The extreme economic downturn and widespread collapse in public revenues
caused by the Great Depression forced a broad spectrum of countries – which started from
extremely low taxation levels by today’s standards – to reconsider their taxing strategies. For
some nations, the early 1930s represent the beginning of far-reaching changes in taxation and
in the role of governments in the economy. In the United States, for example, the expansion of
income taxation and of Federal spending programs in the 1930s ushered in a new era (Wallis,
2000; Fishback and Wallis, 2013). This is also true at the sub-national level: Gillitzer (2017)
2See Gavin and Perotti (1997), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Mendoza and
Oviedo (2006), Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013) and Vegh and Vuletin (2015),
amongst others.
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shows that US states that were hit more severely than average by the Depression were more
likely to introduce new taxes compared to states hit by smaller slumps. Argentina provides
another illustration. The country introduced its very first income tax in 1932 as response to
the Depression (Alhadeff, 1985). More generally, the share of countries adopting withholding
doubled during the interwar years, opening the way for modern tax systems (Besley and Persson,
2014).
The newly-assembled data confirms the existence the rapid increase in fiscal capacity in
Europe and North America in the aftermath of the Depression. WWII and the consolidation of
welfare states in the War’s aftermath certainly contributed to the patterns of taxation we see
today, but divergent paths between Western economies and the rest of the world were already
visible in this earlier period.3.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I discuss the concept and relevance of fiscal
capacity in Section 2. In Section 3, I discuss how revenue volatility can affect policy and the
action of states more generally. In Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the econometric strategy
to investigate the link between fiscal capacity and government financing smoothing. Section
6 discusses the quantitative importance of the results, while Section 7 explores the borrowing
channel through which fiscal capacity affected government financing. Section 8 concludes.
2 Fiscal capacity: definition, measurement and impact
2.1 What is fiscal capacity and why does it matter?
Historians, sociologists and other social scientists have long recognized that the development
of means to raise taxes deserves serious study. Although Joseph Schumpter argued along these
lines already in 1918 in the wake of the tumultuous changes brought about by World War I
(Schumpeter, 1918), only a relatively recent literature in modern Economics has started tackling
fundamental questions, such as where states’ ability to raise revenues comes from and what im-
pact it has on the economy, beyond the distortionary effects of taxes commonly discussed. Tim
Besley and Torsten Persson, two pioneers of this literature, argue that it has been recognized
that “[...] the power to tax is about much more than raising tax revenues – it is at the core of
state development” (Besley and Persson (2014), page 100). However, despite a growing recog-
nition of the role of fiscal institutions in shaping economic performance, most macroeconomic
models still assume that governments always have the ability to raise the desired or needed tax
revenues and are, in general, effective. This was clearly not the case historically, but neither is
it today in many developing countries.
The concept of fiscal capacity – coined by Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1975, 1990) – is usually
understood to represent the level of development of a country’s fiscal system. Often, it is also
considered as a more general indicator of state capacity and, in particular, of the ability of a
government to implement complex policies (Rogers and Weller, 2013). This is because fiscal
3The data includes some information on local governments, however, further work is necessary to increase the
coverage on local governments in the interwar period – as in many other historical contexts – in order to fully
grasp changes in taxation patterns (Hoffman, 2015; Dincecco, 2015)
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capacity furnishes the necessary resources for the provision of public goods and the creation and
maintenance of a qualified and efficient bureaucracy able to monitor the economy and society.
From a theoretical perspective, Besley and Persson (2010) have shown that investments in legal
and fiscal capacity are often complements. This leads to strong links between the ability to
raise taxes and to provide market-supporting institutions. The complementarity between fiscal
capacity, state development and institutional quality means that rich countries are also high tax
countries, with good enforcement of contracts and property rights. Dincecco and Prado (2012)
and Dincecco and Katz (2016) offer convincing empirical evidence of the positive effect of fiscal
capacity on long-term economic performance at country level, whereas Dittmar and Meisenzahl
(2016) offer evidence of this effect at city-level for pre-modern Germany.4
A high fiscal capacity, particularly when accompanied by effective restraints on the executive,
is also indicative of an at least partly successful and functional bargain between the state and
the economic elites. This is particularly important in the historical context because of the quasi-
voluntary nature of taxation which still prevailed in some countries – for example Switzerland
(Farquet, 2012) – in the interwar period. Apart from facilitating the taxing of a non-negligible
share of resources, elite cooperation can also promote the implementation and success of policies.
The measurement of fiscal capacity is directly connected to these considerations. The share
of taxes in GDP, the share of income (direct) taxes in GDP and the share of income (direct)
taxes in total tax revenues are all widely used indicators of fiscal capacity. In my research,
I also rely on these. The key insight is that the amount and types of resources the state is
able to tax are both important elements of fiscal capacity. They exemplify the two aspects of
institutional quality outlined above: 1) the amount of resources available to support the state’s
infrastructure, 2) the level of cooperation of the elites. Income (direct) taxes are a particularly
good indicator of both. This is because they rely on a broad tax base, they are some of the most
demanding taxes to collect in terms of monitoring and fiscal infrastructure, and they require
some consensus between the state and the more or less broad elites for effective collection. At
the other end of the spectrum are trade taxes. These are considered easy to collect, the tax base
– goods entering and/or leaving the country – is easy to monitor, and the political bargain with
the elites more straightforward. Indeed, Sokoloff and Zolt (2007), amongst others, note that
richer countries have tax systems that are more progressive and rely on personal and corporate
income taxes and broad-based property taxes, whereas poorer ones rely mainly on taxes on
consumption, excise taxes and custom duties.
4Even in the absence of large scale public goods provision, state capacity can foster growth and market integration
by protecting from external predation, removing institutional barriers to trade, limiting the ability of local elites
to extract rents, and offering widely applicable rule of law and regulations. A more effective bureaucracy
might also be better able to resist the vested interests and rent seeking of the elites, and to raise taxes in a
less distortionary way. For comprehensive illustrations of the relationship between state/fiscal capacity and
development see also Epstein (2000); Acemoglu (2005); Hoffman (2015); Bardhan (2016) and Johnson and
Koyama (2017).
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2.2 Limits to the development of fiscal capacity
Difficulties in creating centralized revenue raising institutions are severe and have undermined
the process of state formation for long stretches of human history. The first modern fiscal states
appeared in Europe only in the last 200 to 300 or so years. Moreover, centralized taxation
represents a necessary, but insufficient, condition for the creation of effective states. Parlia-
mentary supremacy – i.e. an effective control of the executive – is generally considered to be a
necessary complementary feature to fiscal centralization. This became widespread only in the
19th century in Europe (Dincecco, 2015).
A consensus in the literature is that reforms of fiscal constitutions are often the result of
extreme circumstances (O’Brien, 2011). Wars and conflicts, such as the French Revolution, the
English Civil War and the two World Wars, are examples of the type of events that can have a
major impact on the role of governments in the economy and on the way taxes are raised. Tilly
(1975) famously argued that “War made the state and the state made war”.
Major macroeconomic events can also lead to fiscal reforms by, for example, increasing
the demand for the provision of public goods, such as unemployment insurance. The Great
Depression in the United States is an example of this at both the federal and state level (Wallis
and Weingast, 2005; Gillitzer, 2017). In general, any exogenous increase in the demand for
public goods can have both static and dynamic effects on the accumulation of fiscal and other
state capacities. However, differing degrees of political resistance to increases in taxation will
eventually determine how much the state is able to actually expand its franchise (O’Brien, 2011;
Hoffman, 2015).
The underpinnings of the bargain between the economic elites, the broader public and
the state regarding taxation are very probably contingent on time and place. Resistance to
taxation can emerge, for instance, from a desire not to cede resources to an unaccountable and
unrestrained sovereign. When a sovereign cannot credibly commit to refrain from confiscation,
as is often in the case in absolutist regimes, a low fiscal capacity scenario might be the only
viable equilibrium, as shown by Ma and Rubin (2017) for Qing China.
Both political scientists and economists have also argued that resistance to taxation can
have its roots in the unwillingness to share resources with categories of people perceived as
different. These differences can be due, for example, to ethnic, regional, or religious identities
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Lieberman, 2003; Chaudhary
and Rubin, 2016; Desmet, Gomes, and Ortuño-Ort́ın, 2016). However, fiscal reforms need
not be connected to interclass, interethnic and inter-religious distributional issues or even to
the financing of the welfare state. Mares and Queralt (2016), for example, argue that the
introduction of the income tax in Britain was tied to the redistribution of the tax burden within
the economic elite, from the traditional land-owning class to the recently emerged industrialists.
Even when starting conditions and shocks provide favorable conditions for big changes in
fiscal systems, these cannot happen overnight due to the learning process and the investments
in fiscal and human capital necessary for levying new taxes (Sylla and Wallis, 1998; Hansen,
2001; Sokoloff and Zolt, 2007). Thus, countries with inefficiently weak states unable to raise
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sufficient revenues and to provide growth and welfare enhancing public goods have existed for
most of history and continue to exist today in many parts of the world. This is the central
message of much of the literature on this topic, which, in one form of the other, maintains that
history matters in the creation and persistence of fiscal institutions.5
2.3 Fiscal capacity, borrowing and macroeconomic policy
The underdevelopment of fiscal capacity does not only limit countries’ long term growth po-
tential, but also their space for maneuver when dealing with cyclical fluctuations in economic
activity and shocks more generally. As Besley and Persson (2010) point out, fiscal capacity
is not fully utilized at all times, but past investments make it possible to raise revenue when
this is necessary.6 A key tool to deal with adverse shocks is borrowing, which has historically
been intimately tied to fiscal development. Economic historians have long linked Britain’s ex-
ceptional ability to borrow to its early development as an advanced fiscal state, for example
(North and Weingast, 1989; Bordo and White, 1991; O’Brien, 2011).7 In a comparative setting,
Dincecco (2009) shows that European countries with centralized and/or limited regimes – the
two preconditions for effective, high capacity states – enjoyed cheaper access to credit in the
period 1750-1913.
Limits to the ability to borrow are still a key factor in fiscal policy today. Gavin and Perotti
(1997) argue that borrowing constraints have been important determinants of pro-cyclical fiscal
policy in Latin America. Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) suggest that the more severe financial
frictions faced by developing countries in borrowing markets, combined with greater tax revenue
volatility, can explain the procyclicality of their fiscal policies and their lower debt-to-GDP ratios
5See, amongst many others, Acemoglu (2005); Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vidigni (2011); Besley and Persson (2009);
Besley, Ilzetzki, and Persson (2013); Besley and Persson (2014); Dincecco and Prado (2012); Dincecco (2015);
Dincecco and Katz (2016); Hoffman (2015) and Johnson and Koyama (2017).
6An example of this is provided by Sylla and Wallis (1998) who highlight the role of pre-existing state-level revenue
structures in the debt crisis of the 1840s in the US. The authors argue that some states faced insurmountable
obstacles to raising additional taxes, leading to a wave of defaults following the 1839 recession. According to
the authors, newly established frontier states had narrower tax bases than older ones, and relied on property
taxes which were too politically costly to expand rapidly in order to continue servicing the debts. Another is
provided by O’Brien (2011) who highlights that Britain historically faced less constraints to the expansion of its
fiscal base than its main rival powers France, Spain, Austria, Denmark, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This
means that it was able to weather fiscal and financial crises with more ease and with more rapid recoveries.
7More precisely, North and Weingast (1989) argued that the shift of power from the king to parliament after
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 opened the way for more extensive taxation by transferring control of the
fiscal resources to broad elites. This, in turn, increased Britain’s credibility, allowing it to borrow extensively
and relatively cheaply on financial markets. Some authors stress the importance of earlier periods in British
constitutional and fiscal history, particularly the Commonwealth and Civil War (O’Brien, 2011), but the main
message is unchanged. Bordo and White (1991) further argued that the superior strength and credibility of
its fiscal system allowed the United Kingdom to borrow and inflate its economy more extensively than France
during the Napoleonic Wars, while O’Brien and Palma (2016) make a similar argument on the monetary side,
highlighting the importance of the Bank of England’s previous commitment to an orthodox monetary policy.
Stasavage (2016) paints a less optimistic picture of these developments. The author argues that institutional
reforms rest on two different narratives that are often conflated. On one side are executive constraints, shared
governance and transparency, which are generally perceived as good. On the other side are restrictions on the
influence of tax payers and the devolvement of decision power to creditors, which are redistributive in nature
and not necessarily welfare enhancing. The author argues that British and European history support the latter
narrative more consistently.
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compared to industrial countries.8 Theoretical models have also formalized the idea that the
efficiency of tax systems endogenously affects creditworthiness and, thus, the ability to borrow
(Aizenman, Gavin, and Hausmann, 2000; Arellano and Bai, 2016; Bi, Shen, and Yang, 2016).9
With many countries still having to “graduate” from fiscal policy procyclicality (Frankel, Vegh,
and Vuletin, 2013), understanding the origin of the constraints that keep countries locked in
this inefficient policy space is an extremely relevant issue.
3 The impact of revenue volatility
Figure 2 illustrates annual percentage changes in central government tax revenues, financing
and expenditure for the countries in my sample. These are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Uruguay and
Yugoslavia with various degrees of temporal coverage between 1927 and 1938. Some of these
countries are later left out of the analysis due to lack of data on co-variates.10
While the definition of tax revenues and public expenditure are straightforward, the com-
position of government financing, which is my main variable of interest in the analysis, deserves
a brief explanation. This variable is made up of tax revenues, non-tax revenues and long-term
borrowing (over 1 year maturity). Interestingly, it represents perhaps the most widely reported
fiscal aggregate by statistical offices in the interwar period, when it was classified as simply gov-
ernment revenue. In essence, it is a measure of the planned and budgeted part of government
expenditure, which made up the vast majority (96%) of public budgets. Although short-term
borrowing was used to make up for budget short-falls, the financing variable, and long-term
borrowing in particular, are the portions of public intakes that are most closely related to fiscal
capacity and institutional quality more generally. They are thus the focus of my analysis.
The dispersion of the variables is very large and can only be partially attributed to changes
in economic activity. In fact, as mentioned above, both revenue and expenditure were more
volatile than GDP in this period. The analysis below shows that tax revenues moved very
closely with economic activity. Government financing, instead, was less responsive to changes
in output thanks to the contribution of non-tax revenues. This smoothing effect is analyzed in
detail below.
8See Ilzetzki (2011) for an alternative, political economy-based, explanation for fiscal policy procyclicality. This
is grounded in disagreements amongst successive governments regarding the distribution of public spending.
9Esslinger and Müller (2015) show that the relationship between capacity and borrowing can also go the other
way. Through a political economy model that endogenizes choices regarding investment in fiscal capacity, while
explicitly allowing for public debt and the possibility of default, the authors show that borrowing can facilitate
investment in fiscal capacity, but only if income fluctuations are not too large.
10I have also collected data on India and Indonesia, but these countries are excluded from the analysis because
they were not independent sovereign states at the time.
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Figure 2: Annual percentage changes in fiscal aggregates, 1927-38
All variables are in nominal terms. The box-plot illustrates the median, interquartile range and adjacent values
of the variables. Government financing is composite, which includes tax revenues, revenues from publicly owned
enterprises and capital, other unclassified revenues and long term (over 1 year maturity) borrowing. This was
a widely reported fiscal aggregate in the interwar period, which essentially represented the budgeted part of
government expenditure and made up around 96% of total fiscal resources. Source: author’s calculation see
Appendix B for details.
3.1 Fiscal policy: the interwar experience
Given this backdrop of instability, how was fiscal policy conducted in the interwar period?
Fiscal deficits, when at all present, tended to be very small, especially in comparison to the loss
of GDP (Figure 3, see also Almunia, Bénétrix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, and Rua (2010)). For
example, in the US the deficit was less than 6% of GDP in 1933. By comparison, in 2009 it
was 10%. At the same time, the cumulative contraction of real GDP per capita between 2007
and 2009 was less than one sixth of the Great Depression one, around 5% compared to 31%.
Additionally, deficits in early 1930s US were mostly due to the lack of a political consensus on
policies to balance the budget, rather than a form of proto-Keynesianism (De Long, 1998), and
were in any case compensated by surpluses at the state level (Fishback, 2013). Even in Germany,
a country that is conventionally seen as having embraced Keynesianism (nearly) ante-litteram,
the recovery of the 1930s was not driven by fiscal policy (Ritschl, 2002a); a similar story applies
to Sweden (Schön, 2007).11
The extremely limited use of fiscal (and monetary) policy has led scholars to argue that
governments’ responses to the Great Depression were gravely inadequate and potentially aggra-
vated the slump. Eichengreen (1992) highlighed the lack of international cooperation – fueled
by mutual suspicion – and the dominant conceptual framework – underpinned by the balanced
budget ideology – as two key determinants of the weak policy responses to the Depression. In-
deed, even for those potentially well disposed towards Keynesianism, the dogma of the balanced
budget was hard to displace. The smoothing of the business cycle through fiscal and monetary
11As cited by Almunia, Bénétrix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, and Rua (2010)).
9
Figure 3: Fiscal and primary balances as a share of GDP, 1927-36
Source: Statistisches Reichsamt for the fiscal data and Klasing and Milionis (2014) for the nominal GDP data. See
Appendix B for details. FiscalBalance = Expenditure − TaxRevenue; PrimaryBalance = FiscalBalance +
DebtService.
policy was a radical notion even among economists in the Labour camp in the UK – see for
example (Dalton, 1934) – or the Communists in France (Eichengreen, 1992). Eichengreen fur-
thermore identified the dysfunctional interwar Gold Standard as the institutional straitjacket
that limited countries’ maneuvering space on both the monetary and fiscal fronts. According to
the author, the unwillingness to let go of the gold anchor, seen by many as the last connection
to the successful pre-WWI monetary order, constrained expansionary policies and piled further
deflationary pressures and austerity on ailing countries. Temin (1989) similarly argued that the
Gold Standard-imposed limitations to maneuvering space were the fundamental channel for the
spread of the Depression.
But how much room for maneuver would countries have possessed had they been free from
the golden fetters? What constraints, apart from Gold Standard membership, did they face?
On the fiscal side, many countries probably had limited possibilities to act for a number of
reasons.
First, governments in the interwar period were small. Leaving aside all other issues, the
simple fact that states were modestly-sized relative to the economy made large scale fiscal
stimuli practically impossible to implement. Second, sources of finance for governments shrunk
very quickly during the Depression. After 1929, international financial markets, which had
been bolstered by an outburst of US foreign lending after WWI, essentially dried up. Many
countries that had experienced substantial capital inflows during the second half of the 1920s
experienced dramatic reversals and capital flight. On top of this, domestic financial markets were
underdeveloped in many countries and the legacy of the 1920s hyperinflations and the post-’29
collapse in asset prices greatly reduced the wealth governments could tap for domestic borrowing.
Borrowing from central banks was certainly an option for countries not on gold. However, it
is difficult to imagine that the loans some countries would have needed to counterbalance the
10
large funding shortfall would not have had major economic consequences in terms of of further
capital flight in the absence of stringent capital controls, had they been financed by money
printing alone. Supported by my empirical findings, I argue that, in addition to these factors,
a low level of development of the fiscal system was a major constraint on countries’ ability to
smooth government financing, or – at a minimum – limit its collapse through borrowing.
3.2 Beyond fiscal policy: revenue volatility and the action of states
Apart from contributing to procyclical fiscal policies, public revenue volatility can have further
negative repercussions through four main channels. First, the tax-smoothing literature pio-
neered by Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) shows that deviations from the optimal
path of keeping tax rates (the share of income paid into taxes) stable over the business cycle will
lead to additional distortions and welfare losses for any given level of government spending.12
Thus, even dismissing a Keynesian approach, optimal fiscal policy requires the ability to borrow
during slumps to allow taxes to fall in line with output while keeping public expenditures stable.
Second, as shown empirically by Fatás and Mihov (2013), countries with more volatile
fiscal policies have substantially lower long-term growth. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2017)
propose a political economy mechanism through which high public revenues volatility can reduce
the efficiency of public policy and, as a consequence, directly lower economic growth.13
Third, to the extent that revenue volatility contributes to macroeconomic volatility, it can
also indirectly negatively affect economic growth (Loyaza, Ranciére, Servén, and Ventura,
2007).14 Empirical evidence for the post-WWII period indicates that countries and regions
with larger governments consistently display a lower volatility of output (Gaĺı, 1994; Fatás and
Mihov, 2001; Andrés, Doménech, and Fatás, 2008).15 However, the channels through which
larger governments stabilize the economy are not clear. Researchers have argued that auto-
matic stabilizers and simple composition effects might both contribute to the smoothing of
output.16 Automatic stabilizers were extremely limited in geographical diffusion and scope in
12This result is based on this assumption that expenditure is exogenously determined. Ferriére and Karantounias
(Forthcoming) show that, when government expenditure is endogenized, the optimal fiscal policy response can
resemble austerity under certain conditions.
13The mechanism is the following: volatility in public income lowers re-election probability by reducing the
benefit of staying in power; this, in turn, reduces the (political) cost of inefficient policies, such as patronage
and clientelism, thus negatively affecting economic growth.
14Bleaney, Gemmell, and Greenway (1995) and Ebeke and Ehrhart (2011) offer interesting insights by focusing
on sub-Saharan Africa. Both studies find adverse effects of revenue instability on the volatility of government
investment and expenditure, and on the level of public investment.
15Some studies take this as a starting point to argue that countries facing more external shocks due to their
openness will choose to have a larger government sector as a form of self-insurance (Rodrik, 1998; Epifani and
Gancia, 2009).
16The mechanism through which government size reduces macroeconomic volatility proposed in the recent liter-
ature (Andrés, Doménech, and Fatás, 2008) is quite different in spirit to how the smoothing effect of automatic
stabilizers in the traditional Keynesian framework. The latter posits that taxes react more than proportionally
to income shocks so that disposable income, and therefore consumption of credit-constrained consumers, is
smoother than income (De Long and Summers, 1986). This basic mechanism can be extended to government
transfers and general government spending. In Andrés et al, however, the requirements of Real Business Cycle
(RBC) general equilibrium modeling mean that governments smooth consumptions because higher taxes lead
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the interwar period, however, and their role in dampening business cycle fluctuations is unclear
even in modern economies (McKay and Reis, 2016). Composition effects depend on the public
sector being less volatile than the private sector and, thus, a stabilizing force in the economy.
This assumption, however, is based on the limited experience of developed countries in the re-
cent past. In the interwar period, governments were certainly not a stabilizing force on average,
given that both their revenues and expenditures were more volatile than GDP. The ability to
smooth government financing, which I find to be related to the fiscal capacity and thus the
size of governments, can help to explain under what conditions governments reduce or increase
macroeconomic volatility.
Finally, in countries which raise small amounts of revenue compared to the size of the
economy, sudden falls in government financing can disrupt the very functioning of states. During
the early 1930s, many countries around the world experienced dramatic regime changes. The
case of Germany with the rise to power of the NSDAP in 1933 is notorious, but many countries in
Eastern and Central Europe, in Latin America and beyond experienced sharp autocratic turns.
de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke (2013) analyze the link between economic hard times
and right-wing extremisms during the interwar period and find that, where depressed economic
conditions were allowed to persist due to inadequate policy responses, the rise of extremism was
more likely. The inability to prevent a collapse in government financing may have played an
important role in this mechanism, which deserves an exploration in future research.17
4 New data and some descriptive statistics
Existing datasets on fiscal variables in the interwar period are incomplete. The most compre-
hensive sources collecting international data are Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics
volumes (Mitchell, 2007) and Flora et al’s data handbook on Western Europe (Flora, Kraus,
and Pfenning, 1987). However, these do not provide detailed information on tax structures and
are almost exclusively focused on central governments.
I have transcribed data on the size and composition of countries’ central government tax
revenues – as well as some more limited information on local governments – from various pub-
lications of the German Imperial Statistical Office (Statistiches Reichsamt). In the interwar
period, the Office aggregated large amounts of international data from national statistical year-
books, greatly simplifying the task of collecting these data.18 The local level data remains
incomplete and the econometric analysis below focuses on central governments. Nonetheless,
some interesting stylized facts, which improve our understanding of taxation in the interwar
era, can be drawn from both central and local data. Directly below, I discuss my two fiscal
capacity indicators: tax revenues as a share of GDP and income tax revenues as a share of
to consumers having less disposable income to begin with, so that, when a productivity shock hits, the fall in
disposable income is smaller in relative terms.
17Other past regime changes have also been linked to fiscal factors, for example the French Revolution (Tilly,
1975; Sargent and Velde, 1995).
18See Papadia (2017) for more information on the features and reliability fo this source.
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GDP. In Appendix B, I discuss the other data and the sources in detail.
Table 1: Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP
Central tax revenue/GDP Central & Local tax revenue/GDP
Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average
Austria 8 10 15 10 15 21 16
Belgium 5 7 10 7 5 8 11 8
Bulgaria 7 6 8 7 8 8
Czechoslovakia 10 17 14
Denmark 7 5 6 6 12 9 10 10
Finland 7 6 7 7
France 9 13 16 12 15 22 17
Germany 3 7 12 7 12 15 22 17
United Kingdom 14 14 16 14 17 19 18
Greece 8 5 7
Hungary 10 9 15 11 12 20 15
Ireland 14 20 17
Italy 7 9 14 10 10 14 12
Netherlands 6 6 9 7 8 10 16 10
Norway 10 8 8 8 20 14 14 16
Poland 5 7 10 8 13 13 13
Romania 14 15 15 15
Spain 9 8 9
Sweden 6 6 7 6 10 10 10
Switzerland 3 4 6 4 7 10 9
Yugoslavia 11 11
Canada 6 6 7 6
USA 3 3 5 4 8 12 12 10
Argentina 5 4 6 5
Brazil 4 5 4
Chile 8 8 7 8
Colombia 5 5 3 4
Australia 6 7 6 6
Japan 6 5 4 5
Turkey 6 13 8
Egypt 10 10 14 11
South Africa 7 7 10 8
Average 7 8 10 8 10 12 13 12
Western Europe average 7 7 10 8 9 11 15 11
European core average 7 9 13 9 9 13 18 14
Eastern Europe average 9 9 13 11 11 17 12
Latin America average 6 5 5 5
Source: author’s estimates, see Appendix B for detail on the sources. The post-Depression figure for the United
States is from the Historical Statistics of the United States, millennial edition (Wallis, 2006). Pre-GD=1918-28.
Post-GD= 1934-38. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, UK, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. European core: Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands.
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czechslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chie,
Colombia.
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Table 1 offers a comparative picture of tax revenues as a share of GDP. Direct comparisons
across countries are imperfect due to different accounting standards, but are nonetheless useful.
The very low incidence of taxation by the standard of today’s developed countries is immedi-
ately evident. Rich countries today tax around 40% of GDP on average (Besley and Persson,
2014), while the average incidence of central government taxation between 1918 and 1928 was
around 7% and had increased to 10% by 1934-1938. These levels are similar to those of low-tax
developing countries today. The inclusion of local level taxation for countries with available
data only increase the fiscal capacity indicator to 15% and 12% in post-Depression Western
Europe and US respectively.
However, a clearly divergent trend emerges when Europe and the United States are compared
to the rest of the world. In Western Europe, the incidence of taxation at the central level
increased on average from 7% before the Great Depression to 10% after, and from 10% to 13%
when local governments are included. The incidence of taxes rose in almost all the Western
European countries considered in the sample, the exceptions being Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Greece. The relatively high and increasing taxation levels of Eastern Europe are also
noteworthy. Taxes as a share of GDP were slightly higher than in Western Europe as a whole,
but lower than the European core constituted of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. In the US, the increase in tax levels was from 3 to 5% for the federal
and 8 to 12% for the general government respectively. By considering government financing
data, which is more complete than the tax data at the local level,19 Canada can also clearly
be assimilated to the European and US experience of relatively high and increasing revenues
levels. No similar general upward trend is visible in the rest of the world, with the exception of
Egypt and South Africa.
The two African countries in the sample, in fact, also stand out for their relatively high
taxation levels. This could be at least partially explained by the fact that they were a British
protectorate and a recently independent British ex-colony respectively. In Asia, Japan’s taxation
levels are below average. Unfortunately, the coverage of Asia and Africa is limited to these
three countries and to the central government level because of data availability. This rules the
assessment of broader developments in the two continents.
The most striking aspect of the table, however, is Latin America’s overall very low and
stagnant taxation levels, which have persisted, in relative terms, until today (Sokoloff and Zolt,
2007). The only partial exception is Argentina, a country which introduced substantial reforms
– for example by implementing its first income tax – as a result of the Depression.
Table 2 offers an even clearer picture different taxation patterns by presenting information
on income (direct) taxes. Europe, and the European core in particular, stand out for their
high level of direct taxation both as a share of GDP and as a share of overall tax revenue.
As expected, the United Kingdom emerges as the country with the most developed system of
income taxation. Latin America, instead, is confirmed to be lagging behind severely in the
development of its tax system, with the partial exception of Argentina.
The dynamics of direct taxes offer an interesting picture as well. In most European countries
19When the tax and financing data overlap, they offer a very similar picture.
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Table 2: Income (direct) taxes as a percentage of GDP and total tax revenues
Income Tax Revenue/GDP Income Tax Revenue/Total Tax Revenue
Country Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average
Austria 2.5 2.4 2.9 2.5 30.4 24 19.2 26.1
Belgium 1.9 2.4 3 2.3 37.9 33.3 30.3 33.3
Bulgaria 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 21.5 26.3 20.5 23
Czechoslovakia 2.1 3.1 2.6 20.4 17.7 19.1
Denmark 2.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 38.4 34.1 30.2 33.8
Finland 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 22.1 23.8 20.5 22.1
France 3.3 4 4.7 3.9 35.6 32.2 29.1 32.6
Germany 1.1 1.5 6 2 19.1 22 50 24.8
United Kingdom 7.9 7.6 7.8 7.7 57.3 56.3 49.6 53.5
Greece 1.6 1.2 1.4 19.7 22.8 21
Hungary 2.4 3 4.8 3.4 23.9 33.2 31.7 30.6
Ireland 3.9 4.9 4.4 27.9 25.1 26.5
Italy 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.3 39.4 32 25.4 32.8
Netherlands 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 45.3 40.5 27.5 38.4
Norway 4 2.4 2.6 2.7 38.4 31.7 30.3 31.7
Poland 1.7 2.3 3.4 2.5 31.6 30.8 34.4 32.2
Romania 3.8 4.2 3.1 3.5 26.9 29.2 20.9 24.1
Spain 2.9 2.8 2.8 32.4 33.2 32.8
Sweden 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.7 28.3 26 23.9 25.5
Switzerland 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 17.2 13.1 12.6 13.6
Yugoslavia 2.5 2.5 22.9 22.9
Canada 1 1.3 1.6 1.2 17.4 20.9 22.9 19.9
United States of America 2.2 2 2.4 2.2 66.1 60.9 47.9 58.7
Argentina 0.2 0.4 1 0.5 4.3 8.8 17.1 10
Brazil 0.2 0.4 0.3 6.8 9.1 8
Chile 1.8 2.4 1.8 2 21.5 30.2 24.4 26.1
Colombia 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 4.8 9.8 16 10.3
Australia 1.6 2 1 1.4 26.3 28.8 17.8 22.5
Japan 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.7 32.9 30 39.1 32.6
Turkey 1 4.5 2.4 17.1 35.8 23.3
Egypt 2.8 2.8 3.9 3.2 29.3 27.8 27.3 28.1
South Africa 3 3.9 5.9 4 42.8 43.1 56.1 47.9
Average 2.3 2.3 2.8 2.3 30.1 28.3 27.8 27.7
Western Europe average 2.5 2.4 3 2.5 31.6 28.7 26.8 28.7
European core average 3.3 3.5 4.6 3.6 39.1 36.1 35.3 35.9
Eastern Europe average 2.3 2.8 3.2 2.7 24.9 29.9 25 25.8
Latin America average 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 10.2 13.9 16.6 13.6
Source: author’s estimates, see Appendix B for detail on the sources. The post-Depression figure for the United
States is from the Historical Statistics of the United States, millennial edition (Wallis, 2006). Pre-GD=1918-28.
Post-GD= 1934-38. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, UK, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. European core: Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands.
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czechslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chie,
Colombia.
– the exceptions are Germany, Greece, Hungary and Poland – and in some non-European
countries – the US and Australia – the share of income taxes in overall tax revenues decreased
15
significantly over the course of the interwar period, while their share in GDP tended to increase.
This partly reflects a return to a lower relative reliance on income taxes after the strain of WWI.
The expansion of indirect taxes – such as taxes on sales, consumption, capital transactions and
transportation – also played a substantial role in the decrease of the relative importance of
income taxes in this period. These factors, however, do not change the fact that income taxes
continued to increase compared to the size of the economy in these countries. The picture for
custom duties, instead, is less clear cut. In general, they lost some relevance in this period, but
the pattern is different in every country.
The increase in fiscal capacity in Europe and North America documented in the tables
suggests that the staggering increase in the incidence of taxation, which took place over the
course of the 20th century, was already well under way in the interwar era. Research on the US
has identified the Great Depression as a crucial episode in triggering an increase in the role of
government in the economy (Wallis, 2000; Gillitzer, 2017), and it would appear that a similar
pattern can also be identified for Europe. Naturally, rearmament during the second half of the
1930s, and not just the Great Depression, played a role in these patterns, but crucially, these
were not reversed after the war, indicating that deep structural changes were underway.
5 Empirical strategy
This section outlines the empirical strategy of the principal analysis of this paper. Its objective
is detecting and quantifying the effect of pre-existing tax structures, in conjunction with changes
in economic activity, on changes in fiscal aggregates.
More precisely, I study the impact of fiscal capacity on tax revenues and on the composite
introduced above: government financing. This is made up of tax revenues, non-tax government
income – i.e. the profits of publicly owned corporations and public monopolies and other
unclassified revenues including the sales of some commodities abroad – and long-term – over
1 year maturity – borrowing. As mentioned above, this variable represented the planned part
of governments’ budgets and the bulk of resources at their disposal – 96% on average between
1927 and 1938 – while tax revenues represented on average 73%. Governments also relied on
short-term borrowing from various sources – including central banks – to ramp-up spending
within short time horizons.
The results indicate a major role for fiscal capacity in reducing the instability government
financing, while the results for just tax revenues indicate no effect. This suggests that high
capacity countries were able to smooth their public revenues though non-tax revenues, as would
be desirable from an optimal fiscal policy perspective. I hypothesize that these findings are due
the impact of fiscal capacity on countries’ ability to borrow and explore this channel in detail
in Section 7. I conclude that fiscal capacity, by signaling higher institutional quality, allowed
countries to borrow more extensively and more cheaply.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. I firstly discuss the model used in the
estimations (Section 5.1). I then discuss two important issues: the interpretation of the fiscal
capacity coefficients (Section 5.2), and the possibility of reverse causality between my outcome
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variables and output (Section 5.3). Finally, I outline my instrumental variable (IV) strategy
(Section 5.4). of
5.1 Model
The basic empirical approach consists in relating annual changes in public revenues to annual
changes in economic activity measured by GDP. This approach is common in the empirical
literature studying the elasticity of revenues to changes in output.20
I introduce several innovations compared to previous studies. First, I investigate the impact
of fiscal capacity on government revenues volatility. Second, I control for the composition of tax
revenues, the degree of fiscal capacity and the other control variables by keeping them constant
at their average values before the estimation period. I adopt this strategy to reduce the risk of
reverse causality – countries might choose a particular tax system because of changes in their
revenues – and to deal with confounding effects due to idiosyncratic changes in the regressors
unrelated to true changes in fiscal institutions. This is important because my objective is
establishing how the persistence of fiscal systems locks-in countries leading to differences in
the response of revenues to economic shocks. Third, I deal with potential endogeneity by
instrumenting fiscal capacity with the time countries spent fighting major external conflicts,
in line with the literature studying the impact of fiscal capacity on long-term development
(Dincecco and Prado, 2012), and by introducing a novel instrument: the incidence of natural
disasters.
I begin the analysis by simply estimating the elasticity of tax revenues and government fi-
nancing to economic activity. Economic activity is measured by the nominal, non-PPP-adjusted
GDP provided by Klasing and Milionis (2014) (NGDP). This is a useful indicator given that
changes in revenues are driven by both changes in real economic activity and prices. The alter-
native would be to use changes in real GDP and convert the revenues into constant prices, but
the choice of deflator is problematic and particularly challenging in the strong deflationary con-
text of the the Great Depression. Even with an adequate deflator, the PPP adjustment would
have to be accounted for. Using Klasing and Milionis’ data represents the most straightforward
solution. The differences models is outlined in equation 1 where ci are country fixed effects, lt
are year fixed effects and εi,t are idiosyncratic disturbances.
∆Revenuei,t = β0 + β1∆NGDPi,t + ci + lt + εi,t (1)
The inclusion of country fixed effects allows me to control for a vast array of time invariant or
20For an early example see Vogel and Trost (1979)’s study of the elasticity of tax receipts to changes in income
in US states between 1957 and 1975; Kodrzycki (2014) applies the methodology to contemporary US states
revenues, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) use it in a cross-country setting and Brückner (2012) employs to focus on
sub-Saharan African countries. In a different, but connected application, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) use it to study
the cyclicality of tax rates, rather than revenues, across countries. While in the literature, this relationship is
often estimated in levels as well, I retain the differences specification for the whole analysis in order to account
for the probable persistence and non-stationarity of the data. Due to the large size of the swings in the
dependent variables, I use percentage changes rather than log differences given that the latter represent precise
approximations only for small percentage changes.
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slow moving country characteristics – including geography, demography and economic structure
– and to thus minimize the danger of omitting a variable correlated with the regressors and
causal for the dependent variable. Time fixed effects allow me to account for common shocks.
Panel estimation also minimizes issues of cross-country comparability of the data by exploiting
the time series rather than cross-sectional variation of the variables.
After estimating simple elasticities, I expand the model include my fiscal capacity indicator.
In addition, I control for the structure of tax revenues – since these are potentially correlated
with both the outcome and the capacity indicator – and a series of other vaeriables included in
vector x. The structure of tax revenues is measured as a the share of trade taxes and the share
of indirect taxes in total tax revenue. Income taxes are excluded to avoid collinearity, but the
results are robust to their inclusion in place of either the trade or indirect taxes. The rest of the
right hand variables are discussed throughout the analysis, and described in detail in Appendix
B.
As mentioned above, I use two indicators of fiscal capacity – taxes as a share of GDP and
income taxes as a share of GDP – while using the share of income taxes in total tax revenue as an
(implicit) control. The objective of the paper is to estimate the effect of fiscal capacity separately
from the effect of the composition of tax revenues. The two effects are different because the
former regards the reaction of revenues to changes in a particular tax base (income, imports,
sales, etc.) while the latter deals with the more general way in which the level of development of
a tax system influences changes in revenues. The empirical analysis demonstrates that, indeed,
the tax share indicators measure something different from the fiscal capacity indicators, at least
in the interwar context. While I find no significant connection between the share of income
taxes in tax revenue and government financing volatility, however measured my fiscal capacity
indicators are significantly associated with revenue smoothing.
The model is not yet satisfactory for three reasons. First, it simply estimates whether,
given a certain fiscal structure and a certain change in economic activity, changes in revenues
are smaller or larger on average. This is not particularly informative given that changes in
activity and revenues can be both positive and negative. The result of the estimation will
be a simple average of the two. Second, there is no reason to believe that the response of
revenues to changes in economic activity should be linear. One could expect large shocks to
be different from small shocks. Third, the presence of time-invarying regressors makes the
estimation problematic because, with standard panel data methods, their coefficients cannot be
estimated. Failing to quantify these might lead to a partial picture of the marginal effect of
fiscal systems on revenues. My solution to overcome all these issues is twofold. First, similarly
to Brückner (2012), I interact the percentage change in economic activity (∆NGDP) with all
the other regressors. The result is that all the variables become time-varying and I can now
identify non-linear relationships in the data. Second, I employ the the Hausman and Taylor
(1981) (HT) approach alongside standard estimators. This allows me the obtain the coefficients
of time-invarying regressors, while controlling for fixed-effects.
The model is now as follows:
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∆Revenuei,t = β0 + β1∆NGDPi,t + φ1FiscalCapacityi,av + φ2TradeTaxSharei,av
+φ3IndirectTaxSharei,av + xi,avγ + ∆NGDPi,t ∗ zi,avθ + ci + lt + εi,t (2)
where z = {FiscalCapacity, TradeTaxShare, IndirectTaxShare,x}.
The av subscripts on the regressors indicate that they are 1914-1926 averages, while the re-
gressions are run from 1927 to 1938.21 Due to the presence of interactions, the marginal
effect of the variables changes with the value of the variable with which the interaction oc-
curs. For example, the marginal effect of ∆NGDP is now E(∆Revenue|∆NGDP + 1, z) −
(∆Revenue|∆NGDP, z) = β1 + zθ, where the vector z is held constant. The marginal ef-
fect of the element j of z is E(∆Revenue|zj + 1,∆NGDP ) − E(∆Revenue|zj ,∆NGDP ) =
φj +θj∆NGDP , where this time ∆NGDP is held constant. I offer intuitive illustrations of the
magnitude of the results in Section 6.6.
5.2 Interpreting the fiscal capacity coefficients
The main coefficients of interest in the analysis illustrate the reduced form relationship between
fiscal capacity (interacted with changes in NGDP or not) and changes in tax revenues and
government financing. The underlying hypothesis is that fiscal capacity will affect the extent
to which revenues change following shocks to economic activity. In the interwar context, it is
sensible to interpret annual changes in public revenues as a combination of three factors: 1)
automatic reactions to changes in output (i.e. the elasticity), 2) changes in fiscal policy; 3) a
general positive trend in public revenues (to the extent that this does not get filtered out by
first differencing). The first two elements depend directly on changes in economic activity, so
that:
∆Revenue = ∆NGDP × {Elasticity + PolicyReaction}+ Trend
A distinction can be drawn between the two outcome variable of the analysis. In the case of
tax revenues, for policy reactions to play an important role one would need to assume that fiscal
policy in the interwar period responded in a systematic way and with no lag to economic condi-
tions. Based on what we know, this is not realistic. Fiscal policy was essentially not employed
as a tool if not in an extremely limited way and in a handful of countries. Delay in budgetary
processes and parliamentary approval would have made it very difficult for governments to
change tax policy to respond contemporaneously to changes in economic conditions. Moreover,
although the monitoring of economic activity made significant progress in some countries in
the interwar era, this was still a relatively new and limited phenomenon, making it difficult for
governments to respond in real time. In particular, the concept of GDP did not exist and it is
21For some countries, observations before 1926 are limited, so the averages at times refer to 1 to 3 observations
only. For robustness, I also run the model for a longer sub-period, 1921-38, using alternatively full sample
averages (1914-38) and 5-year moving averages as regressors. The results are very similar.
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thus difficult to fathom the existence of fiscal policies designed to respond to yearly changes in
this variable.
In summary, it is implausible to assume systematic and contemporaneous policy reactions
in terms of tax law changes to changes in economic activity in the interwar period. Therefore,
the bulk of the variation in tax revenues should reflect the elasticity of tax revenues to changes
in economic activity and the trend. In this scenario, fiscal capacity should affect tax revenues
only to the extent that it captures the breadth of the tax base. Since I control for the structure
of tax revenues, however, the expectation is that fiscal capacity should not affect the response
of tax revenues to changes in output. This is indeed the case, as the results demonstrate.
When considering government financing, however, the role of policy reactions can no longer
be ignored. This is because the amount a country borrows (a component of the financing
variable) is a policy choice, which needs to be made however imperfect the information available
to the policymaker might be. This choice can be further broken down into two components.
One is the extent to which a country smoothes its revenues on average through borrowing
in response to changes in economic activity, which depends on country specific factors, such
as fiscal capacity. The other is discretionary changes in the preference for borrowing. The
smoothing effect of fiscal capacity on government financing represents my quantity of interest,
whereas the discretionary component, if unrelated to fiscal capacity or the other regressors,
will simply end up in the error term without affecting the estimates. With the inclusion of an
adequate set of controls, which account for countries’ economic and political conditions, the
model outlined above should be able to capture precisely the magnitude of interest. Indeed,
the smoothing effect of fiscal capacity on financing emerges strongly and clearly throughout the
whole analysis.
5.3 Reverse causality between changes in revenue and economic activity
Although estimating the relationship between changes in economic activity and revenue is the
not the primary goal of this paper, it is nonetheless important to insure that reverse causality
between economic activity and revenues does not mar the estimation. This is because the
resulting bias might affect the other coefficients as well. Fortunately, there are substantial
reasons to exclude dangers to inference.
First, for the reverse causality between economic activity and revenues to be a concern, one
would have to assume that GDP in the interwar period responded in a systematic way and with
no lag to changes in public revenues. Leaving aside the long-standing and so far inconclusive
empirical and theoretical debates on the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity, there is
no strong theoretical prior regarding the impact of an increase in revenue, narrowly or broadly
defined, on GDP without regard to what is happening on the expenditure side. Changes in
revenue alone tell us nothing about the stance of policy. The correlation between changes in
my government financing variable and expenditure, albeit strong (0.624), is far below 1. As
mentioned earlier, changes in expenditures were influenced by short term borrowing, which is
excluded from my analysis. The correlation between changes in tax revenue and expenditure,
instead, is low at 0.158.
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Second, our knowledge of the Depression years indicates that changes in output were most
likely little related to fiscal policy. As discussed above, in most cases fiscal policy was not
used. In the few cases in which countries did run deficits, these were too small to be effective.
(Almunia, Bénétrix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, and Rua, 2010).
Third, while basic economic theory tells us that a higher tax burden will distort economic
activity leading to lower output, the regression coefficients do not square with causality running
from changes in revenue to changes in output in the interwar period. Whereas one would expect
a negative correlation between changes in tax revenues and GDP, this is positive, and strongly
so. Moreover, one would expect changes in government financing (which includes long term
borrowing) to be more positively correlated with GDP than tax revenues, since more borrowing
should lead to more public expenditure and higher output. However, I find the opposite:
government financing is less strongly positively correlated with GDP than tax revenues. This
indicates that causality ran from changes in economic activity to changes in tax revenues, which
were then partially mitigated by non-tax revenues.
Despite this evidence, worries that changes in revenue could affect economic activity remain.
As a final reassurance that my results are not affected by reverse causality, I run a robustness
check in which I use a similar methodology to Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008): I instrument changes in
output with average changes in the GDP of trading partners weighed by the pre-Depression share
of exports going to that country. This exercise also serves to insure that potential non-linearities
in the effect of changes in GDP in fiscal capacity do not affect the outcome variable directly,
thus invalidating my IV strategy. By using this methodology, I can also employ expenditures
directly as my outcome variable with fewer worries about reverse causality. I report the results
of this exercise, which yields very similar results to the baseline analysis, in Appendix A.
5.4 IV strategy
The main empirical relationship of interest, that between changes in revenues and fiscal capacity,
might also be affected by endogeneity. A plausible way in which this can operate is that countries
with a higher revenue volatility might invest more in fiscal capacity in order to reduce it. In
this case, the effect of fiscal capacity on changes in revenue would be biased towards zero.22
Another potential source of endogeneity, of the opposite sign, is that a higher revenue volatility
might make investments in fiscal capacity more difficult. Thus, the direction of potential bias is
a priori unclear. In order to overcome this threat to causal inference, I employ an instrumental
variable approach.
I use two variables to instrument fiscal capacity. The first is the number of years a country
spent fighting major external conflicts between 1816 and 1913, as reconstructed by Dincecco and
Prado (2012). The use of this variable follows a large literature linking armed conflicts, fiscal
reforms and fiscal development. The second is a novel instrument which, I argue, captures a
different mechanism of fiscal capacity formation. The variable is the number of natural disasters
to hit a country between 1900 and 1990.
22The issue of the potential co-determinateness of economic volatility and government size arises also in other
contexts, as demonstrated by Rodrik (1998)’s study on the effect of openness on government size.
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Figure 4 illustrates the unconditional correlation between the instruments and my two fiscal
capacity indicators. This is positive for the conflict variable (panels 4a and 4b) even if the
United Kingdom, an outlier with significant leverage, is excluded. The correlation is negative
for the disasters variable (panels 4c and 4d) even if the two outliers (Japan and the USA)
are excluded. The analysis shows that both variables represent relevant instruments for fiscal
capacity from a statistical perspective when used alone and in conjunction. Directly below, I
outline why the instruments are relevant and valid from an economic perspective, starting with
the conflicts instrument and proceeding with the disasters one.
(a) Tax Revenues/NGDP (b) Income Tax Revenues/NGDP
(c) Tax Revenues/NGDP (d) Income Tax Revenues/NGDP
Figure 4: Fiscal capacity, the incidence of external conflict and natural disasters
Source: The years at war data is from Dincecco and Prado (2012), the natural disasters data is from the EM-
DAT dataset of the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2017), the GDP data is from Klasing and
Milionis (2014), for the historical tax revenue data see the text and Appendix B for details.
5.4.1 The warfare instrument
In their work, Dincecco and Prado (2012) use the incidence of major past external conflicts –
more likely to have led to substantial and lasting fiscal reforms compared to small conflicts –
as an instrument for contemporary fiscal capacity in order to quantify its effect on long-term
development. The authors construct their instruments from Clodfelter (2002)’s database of
major external conflicts in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania between 1500
and 2000. Their preferred instrument is the number of casualties due to major external conflicts
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between 1816 and 1913 normalized by country size, while their fiscal capacity indicator of choice
is the share of direct taxes in total tax revenue. My instrument of choice, instead, is one they
construct for robustness: the number of years a country spent at war between 1816 and 1913.23
I choose this variable over the casualties indicator because of its stronger correlation with my
fiscal capacity indicators. The casualties variables, instead, is very weakly related to these.
For the warfare instrument to be relevant, different degrees of engagement in external con-
flicts between 1816 and 1913 need to have led to the accumulation of different degrees of fiscal
capacity, which then persisted at least until the interwar period. For the instrument to be valid
three conditions need to be met, conditional on controls: 1) the incidence of conflicts between
1816 and 1913 had no effect on changes in government revenues between 1927 and 1938 except
through its effect on interwar fiscal capacity; 2) changes in revenues in 1927-38 had no effect on
the incidence of conflicts in 1816-1913; 3) there is no reverse causality between fiscal capacity
and warfare. A violation of the first condition could occur if, for example, a higher incidence of
external conflicts raised the probability of a country gaining (losing) access to a revenue source
that was more (less) volatile than its existing tax base. This could be a territory, a port, or a
tradable natural resource. The second condition could be violated if the volatility of revenues in
1927-38 was correlated through persistence to the volatility of revenues in 1816-1913 and this in
turn influenced the probability of fighting wars in this period. Finally, and more worryingly, the
exclusion restriction would be violated if fiscal capacity drove the decision to engage in conflicts
rather than vice versa.
Based on a large body of research by historians, economic historians and other scholars,
Dincecco and Prado argue that “war participation drove fiscal capacity improvements, but that
capacity constraints themselves did not significantly influence whether rulers went to war.”
(page 175). Indeed the work of authors such as Brewer (1990), Tilly (1975, 1990), Hoffman
and Rosenthal (1997), O’Brien (2011), Dincecco, Federico, and Vidigni (2011) and Hoffman
(2015) indicates that in the early modern and modern period the incidence (and threat) of
war stimulated fiscal reforms and other innovations to increase fiscal capacity, particularly in
Europe.24 From a theoretical perspective, Besley and Persson (2010) conceptualize the warfare-
state formation nexus by arguing that war leads to an exogenous increase in the demand for
a public good – defense – which needs to be financed through taxation. The increase in fiscal
capacity due to war, is then maintained and amplified because of the dynamic interactions
between fiscal capacity, legal capacity and development.25
23This variable can exceed 97 if countries are involved in more than one conflict in a given year.
24Dincecco and Prado make an important distinction between external and internal conflicts. While the latter
contribute to the strengthening of fiscal and state capacity, the former can severely damage it. See also Besley
and Persson (2010) on this point.
25Dincecco and Prado illustrate two further channels through which increases in fiscal capacity might persist
after the end of conflicts. First, after the creation of strong and centralized fiscal institutions due to wars “the
new executives inherit strong fiscal institutions, they may wish to exploit them for their own purposes rather
than cede authority back to traditional elites.” Second, the changing nature of warfare in the 19th century may
have led to the elites conceding an increase in the resources made available for taxation in a bargain with the
rulers. Once these changes were implemented, the new taxes might have been redirected towards public services
valued by the elites, rather than the taxation being rolled back to pre-war levels. Alesina, Reich, and Riboni
(2017) offer a complementary perspective by arguing that warfare can shift public expenditure towards public
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Recent empirical evidence supports the existence of a link between warfare and the de-
velopment of fiscal capacity although this might not always persist (Sabaté, 2016), lead to
development of general interest states (Dincecco, Fenske, and Onorato, 2016), or be as strong
outside of European countries (see Centeno (1997, 2002); Gupta, Ma, and Roy (2016) and refer-
ences in Dincecco (2015), page 909-11). Additionally, the ability to rely on borrowing to finance
wars undermined the impact of warfare on fiscal capacity development, since countries could
default on their debts after the end of conflicts instead of increasing tax revenues (Queralt,
2017). Furthermore, countries that faced less political resistance to increases in taxation would
have been able to raise more tax revenues for any given incidence of external conflicts (O’Brien,
2011; Hoffman, 2015). These qualifications highlight the importance of the context in which
conflicts took place, but they are not inconsistent with the causality running from conflict to
capacity; they simply imply that the effects of warfare were not homogeneous across countries
and time due to other factors also playing a role.
Gennaioli and Voth (2015), however, build a theoretical model that incorporates the idea
that causality might also run from fiscal and state capacity to conflict. Their key insight is that
the threat of war after the Military Revolution, which made monetary resources more important
in conflicts, led to cohesive states investing in state building in order to fight wars, while divided
ones dropped out of the competition. Thus, they argue, conflict might not necessarily lead to
the accumulation of fiscal capacity. It is the underlying characteristics of countries that make
these investments possible in the first place.
The panel framework of my analysis allows me to dispel many of these worries. By us-
ing fixed effects, I control for structural differences across countries and for pre-1927 historical
events. Thus, the inclusion of fixed effects drastically reduces the possibility that the incidence
of pre-1913 conflicts could influence the magnitude of revenue changes post-1926 through chan-
nels other than fiscal capacity. The only way in which the exclusion restriction might still be
violated is that a transformation in the nature of pre-1927 circumstances took place in the 12
years between 1927 and 1938 (this circumstances would have to have been caused by pre-1913
conflicts); this would, in turn, need to have an effect on the volatility of post-1927 revenues. This
instance cannot be ruled out, but appears very unlikely given the short time span considered.
Also, I am not aware of any study which claims such an instance. Furthermore, the inclusion of
fixed effects also guarantees that pre-1913 fiscal capacity and revenue volatility are all controlled
for in the regressions, since these are time-invarying country characteristics from the vantage
of point of the period studied in this paper. This accounts for the potential bias coming from
correlations between past capacity, past revenue volatility, past conflicts and current changes in
revenues.
The over-identifying tests conducted below, thanks to the combined use of historical conflicts
and natural disasters, further help dispel worries that warfare might not be a valid instrument.
goods during times of war in order to foster support in the population. More precisely, the authors argue that
states will attempt to modify the degree of political resistance in the population by employing positive and/or
negative nationalisms. The former is tied to creating a national identity and a common language through the
provision of public goods. The latter consists of aggressive negative propaganda towards to opponent and is the
go-to option when the capacity to provide mass public goods is absent.
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These tests, however, are only valid conditional on the natural disasters variable being a relevant
and valid instrument. I now turn to arguing that this is the case.
5.4.2 The disasters instrument
I argue that the incidence of natural disasters can negatively affect the creation of centralized
revenue raising institutions. Moreover, I argue that this effect also applies to countries outside of
Europe. Thus, apart from helping dispel worries of reverse causality between conflicts and fiscal
capacity outlined above, introducing an additional instrument with a broader scope presents
advantages also from this point of view.
Table 3 offers an overview of all disasters for my sample of countries and time period con-
tained in the EM-DAT Database of the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Univer-
sité Catholique de Louvain (CRED, 2017). For an event to qualify as a disaster at least one of
these conditions needs to be met: 1) ≥ 10 casualties, 2) ≥ 100 people affected, 3) declaration of
a state of emergency, 4) call for international assistance. This broad definition means that the
data includes natural disasters of very different magnitudes. This is reflected by the number of
deaths due to the disasters, which varies between 0 and millions for a single incident.
The starting point of the data is 1900 because no information is available before this date. I
pick 1990 as the endpoint of my data because in recent years there has been an increase in natural
disasters potentially linked to global warming and exposure hazard due to population growth,
and thus unrelated to the historical data generating process (Strömberg, 2007). However, results
are robust to using a longer period (1900-2015) or ending the sample in 1926, one year before
the starting point of my analysis, in order to avoid a direct relationship between disasters and
yearly changes in revenue.26
Natural disasters can affect fiscal capacity in two ways. First, when resources have to
be deployed towards disaster relief, all else equal, fewer resources can be dedicated to fiscal
development. As Besley and Persson (2010) argue, countries need to invest in order to create
and strengthen fiscal institutions, and large scale disasters can drain substantial resources,
delaying or impeding these investments altogether. 27
Two objections can be raised against this argument. The first is that war, much like disaster
relief, drains resources away from public investments; however, the historiography and this paper
argue that armed conflicts can lead to the accumulation of fiscal capacity. Why should the effect
of natural disasters be the opposite? A rebuttal for the first objection is that the accumulation
of fiscal capacity is a long-run phenomenon. In the short-run, conflicts, like disasters, might
have led to investment diversion, but in the long term they led to fiscal capacity accumulation by
26The reporting of historical disasters is clearly not as complete as that of more recent episodes. In particular,
small-scale disasters in countries outside of Western Europe and North America are potentially under-reported
in the dataset. This measurement error could bias my results indirectly through its effect on the strength of
the instrument. Standard tests, however, suggest that the instrument is strong enough to limit this potential
source of bias within reasonable bounds.
27The devastating flood which affected around 20% of China’s provinces in 1823 offers an example of this: the
Qing administration devoted around half of its small (relative to the size of the economy) annual budget to
disaster relief and this severely slowed down long-term investments in the provision of public goods, such as
defense and infrastructure (Yuping and Uebele, 2015).
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Table 3: Natural disasters by country, 1900-90
Country Number of disasters Total deaths Deaths per incident Country name Number of disasters Total deaths Deaths per incident
Argentina 32 11079 346 Ireland 7 23 3
Australia 88 1260 14 Italy 63 119533 1897
Austria 18 322 18 Japan 172 216647 1260
Belgium 29 111 4 Netherlands 12 2020 168
Bolivia 24 568 24 New Zealand 32 7210 225
Brazil 89 8568 96 Norway 3 73 24
Bulgaria 7 142 20 Peru 75 81258 1083
Canada 53 51671 975 Poland 9 82 9
Chile 45 60136 1336 Romania 17 3911 230
Colombia 60 28615 477 South Africa 24 906 38
Czechoslovakia 9 24 3 Spain 31 1771 57
Denmark 8 12 2 Sweden 6 24 4
Egypt 8 10406 1301 Switzerland 22 251 11
Finland 2 0 0 Turkey 72 71159 988
France 55 676 12 United Kingdom 22 415 19
Germany 22 64 3 USA 326 34325 105
Greece 34 2055 60 Uruguay 2 8 4
Hungary 3 304 101 Venezuela 19 771 41
Yugoslavia 22 1432 65
Source: EM-DAT Database of the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2017).
making fiscal reforms easier. Given that my disasters variable overlaps with my fiscal capacity
indicators, whereas the conflict data precedes the observation period, the argument has potential
traction. However, it is ultimately unconvincing because the historical incidence of natural
disasters is correlated with a lower fiscal capacity also nowadays.28
The second objection is that most disasters in my sample were not large enough to cause a
significant displacement of resources. For over half of the countries, the average death toll of
each disasters was below 100 people. For the period 1900-26, more than two-thirds of the total
death toll is accounted for by just three epidemics in India, and over half of the disasters led to
under 500 casualties, while the mean population size of the countries in the sample was over 20
million. The second channel I propose addresses all these concerns and also offers a robust and
intuitive mechanism through which disasters affect fiscal capacity.
The argument goes as follows. First, certain geographic features of countries make them
more or less prone to experience natural disasters. More precisely, the interaction between land
size and the presence of volcanoes, the proclivity for seismic activity, the vulnerability to storms
and floods, etc. will determine the number of disasters to a hit a country. Second, most natural
disasters are small scale events affecting limited areas of a country and shares of the population.
Third, this means that localized relief might be better suited – for example because of local
level specialization in areas vulnerable to specific types of disasters – and quicker to reach the
affected area compared to centrally financed and coordinated efforts. Local governments might
also be held more easily accountable by citizens with regard to the provision of relief. Moreover,
28Interestingly, Dincecco and Prado’s preferred fiscal capacity indicator, the share of direct taxes in total tax
revenue, is positively associated with historical disasters (but not long-run disaster proclivity) both today and
in the interwar period, which once again highlights the different informational content of different fiscal capacity
indicators.
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even large scale disaster relief undertaken by central governments relies on local level monitoring
and infrastructure in order to be timely and effective, as evidenced by India’s famines (Drezè
and Sen, 1989; Besley and Burgess, 2002).29 Fourth, the need to finance local level disaster
relief will stimulate the accumulation of local-level fiscal capacity. Indeed, there is a positive
and statistically significant correlation between the number of natural disasters and the share
of taxes raised at the sub-national level in the 1914-38 period.30 Fifth, the local nature of
disasters, of relief and of the institutions created to deal with them will make the centralization
of fiscal resources more difficult in disaster-prone countries, leading to the observed negative
relationship between disasters and fiscal capacity.
The reasoning can also be applied from the standpoint of the citizens of areas of a country
unaffected by natural disasters. These might be less willing to mutualize resources through the
central government, since part of these would fund a pubic good – disaster relief – that only
benefits the citizens of the affected area and is very likely characterized by low spillovers. Under
these conditions – heterogeneous preferences over public goods and low spillovers – decentralized
political systems outperform centralized systems, a result know as the Decentralization Theorem
(Oates, 1972; Besley and Coate, 2003). As above, this reasoning applies to recurring disasters
due to a region’s geographical characteristics, which make it more vulnerable to certain types
of events, rather than to idiosyncratic occurrences of disasters.
An obvious rebuttal of this argument is the possibility of reverse causality: countries might
experience fewer natural disasters thanks to better infrastructure and other means of disaster
prevention made possible by a higher level of fiscal capacity. However, the consensus in the
literature appears to be that “good institutions”, and economic development more generally,
strongly affect the severity of the consequences of disasters, but not their frequency (Kahn,
2005; Strömberg, 2007; Lin, 2015). In other words, disasters are indeed natural, in the sense
that they are caused by geographical features, but there is ample scope for policies to reduce
the number of people they affect and the material damage they cause.
A further potential problem with the disasters instrument is that a lower fiscal capacity
might simply reflect lower tax revenues because of the direct incidence of disasters on the tax
base. However, this would mean that the effect of disasters on the tax base is not captured by
changes in output, which is the denominator of my fiscal capacity indicators. This is possible,
but very unlikely, particularly for the income taxes capacity indicator, given that nominal GDP
is precisely a measure of income. Moreover, by analyzing a century of disasters data in the
US, Boustan, Kahn, Rhode, and Yanguas (2017) show that only major disasters tend to have
significant economic repercussions. Finally, I find absolutely no direct relationship between the
incidence of disasters and revenue volatility in my data.
29In the case of large disasters, countries might also expect to be able to draw on international assistance, as was
common also in the pre-WWII era, leading to the need to accumulate less fiscal capacity to provide relief.
30These are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, UK, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, USA. The data furthermore features a positive correlation between
disasters and the share of income taxes in total tax revenue. This is also compatible with the idea that disasters
might stimulate the creation of local level capacity, making it easier for local governments to raise direct taxes.




Table 4 illustrates the elasticity of tax revenues and government financing to changes in nom-
inal GDP for 1927-38. The first two columns feature OLS estimations for tax revenues and
government financing, while columns 3 and 4 contain the within (FE) estimations and columns
5 and 6 present first differences (FD) results. As expected, fiscal aggregates and nominal GDP
strongly co-move. The key result of the exercise, however, is that the coefficient is close to 1
when tax revenues are considered, but becomes around half of that when government financing
is the outcome variable. These results indicate the existence of a strong smoothing effect of
non-tax revenues.31
The rest of the analysis in this section shows that this smoothing effect is due to the degree
of fiscal capacity countries possessed at the eve of the Great Depression. In Section 7, I dig
deeper into the channels, showing that fiscal capacity granted an easier access to borrowing to
more fiscally capable countries.
Table 4: The elasticity of tax revenues and government financing to changes in output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 0.932*** 0.565*** 1.017*** 0.620*** 0.877** 0.495***
(0.239) (0.118) (0.357) (0.133) (0.358) (0.164)
Constant 0.0443 0.0301*** 0.0443*** 0.0302*** 0.00321 -0.00314
(0.0280) (0.00942) (0.000156) (5.84e-05) (0.0457) (0.0137)
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 231 231 231 231 193 193
Number of countries 31 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.033 0.101 0.038 0.101 0.012 0.044
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
the United States of America and Yugoslavia. All changes (∆) are percentage changes.
31In the table, I only use observations for which both financing and tax revenues data are available, so the result
is not due to differences in the composition of the financing and tax revenues samples. I have repeated the
exercise for 1927-38 and for an extended time period (1920-38) using all observations available and obtained
remarkably similar results (see Appendix A). This indicates that the smoothing role of non-tax revenues was
present throughout the whole interwar period.
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6.2 OLS results
I continue the analysis by adopting the interaction model described by equation 2 and by in-
troducing the main variables of interest – the two fiscal capacity indicators – alongside the
controls. These are: the Polity 2 score from the POLITY IV database (Marshall and Jaggers,
2005), to capture potential differences between more or less democratic countries; GDP per
capita (GDPPC) from the Maddison Project database (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013), to capture
differences between more and less economically developed countries; openness to trade as pro-
vided by Klasing and Milionis (2014), which accounts for the degree of vulnerability to external
shocks and the potential positive relationship between openness and government size (Rodrik,
1998; Epifani and Gancia, 2009). These controls are extremely important because the level
of democracy, economic development and trade openness are likely correlated with both fiscal
development and changes in revenue. I also control for the structure of tax revenues. This is
important in order to identify the causal effect of fiscal capacity and separate it from the me-
chanical response of changes of various tax revenues to changers in income. As discussed above,
I enter all these variables as 1914-26 averages. I have experimented by adding other controls –
such as gold standard membership, and the terms of trade – finding practically identical results
throughout the analysis.
Table 5 reports the pooled OLS estimation results. While these estimates clearly suffer from
two potential sources of bias – omitted variables and reverse causality – which rule out any causal
interpretation of the coefficients, they illustrate some informative correlations. Coherently with
the interpretation of the elasticity results outlined above, once I introduce the fiscal capacity
indicators and the controls in the regressions, the responsiveness of government financing and
of tax revenues to changes in economic activity become very similar. This strongly suggests
that the variables in the regressions capture the lion’s share of the smoothing effect of non-tax
government revenues.
In all specifications, the interaction term between the fiscal capacity measure and NGDP
comes out as strongly significant and negative. This indicates a countercyclical and non-linear
association between fiscal capacity and changes in both tax revenues and government financing
in the size of the shock to NGDP. However, the latter is substantially larger than the former.
While the rest of the analysis confirms the finding for government financing, the one for tax
revenues is not robust, suggesting, once again, that the smoothing effect of fiscal capacity took
place via non-tax revenues.
6.3 Fixed effects results
An important step towards a causal interpretation of the results is to include country fixed-effects
in the regressions. As discussed above, these account for the myriad of potentially important
time-invarying and slow-moving country characteristics both observable and not. Examples
include geography, demographic and economic structure and the presence of natural resources.
I also include time fixed-effects to account for common shocks across countries.
Table 6 and Table 7 present the results of the panel estimations for tax revenues and gov-
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Table 5: Pooled OLS estimation for tax revenues and government financing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 2.813*** 3.226*** 3.314*** 3.638***









Constant -0.0142 0.00641 0.114*** 0.120***
(0.0429) (0.0472) (0.0348) (0.0375)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3 3 3
Openness 3 3 3 3
TradeTaxShare 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*Controls 3 3 3 3
Observations 208 208 219 219
R2 0.336 0.335 0.190 0.172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. All changes (∆) are percentage
changes.
ernment financing respectively. In both tables, columns 1 and 2 provide the FE estimates and
columns 3 and 4 feature the FD results. Both estimators require time-invarying regressors to be
dropped. Columns 5 and 6 present the results of the HT (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) estimator,
which allows me to recover the coefficients of time-invarying regressors even in the presence of
fixed effects.
The panel results for tax revenues only partially confirm the OLS findings. Whereas the
results for the within (FE) and Hausman taylor (HT) estimator are practically identical to
the estimation without fixed effects, the first difference (FD) coefficients for the fiscal capacity
indicators – Tax/NGDP and IncomeTax/NGDP – are drastically smaller and statistically in-
significant. Importantly, unlike FE and HT, the FD estimator does not require strict exogeneity
and therefore allows for feedback loops between the error term and the regressors, if these take
more than one period to operate, without leading to bias. This makes inference based on FD
substantially more robust than that based on FE. It follows that we cannot conclude that fiscal
capacity had any smoothing effect on tax revenues. This is confirmed by the IV analysis.
The results for government financing, instead, are strong and clear cut. The interaction
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Table 6: Panel estimation for tax revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FD FD HT HT
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue
∆NGDP 2.427** 2.943*** -0.929 -0.305 2.252*** 2.858***
(0.877) (0.758) (1.648) (1.769) (0.800) (0.693)
Tax/NGDP -0.398
(0.272)




∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -29.19*** -11.23 -28.64***
(9.170) (23.27) (8.827)
Constant 0.152*** 0.154*** -0.00836 -0.00779 -0.0710 -0.0555







∆NGDP*Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 208 208 184 184 208 208
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23
R2 0.379 0.383 0.124 0.126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. All changes (∆) are percentage
changes.
term between the fiscal capacity indicators and changes in GDP is large, statistically signifi-
cant, negative and generally close to the pooled OLS estimates (the exception being the FD
coefficient on the IncomeTax/NGDP indicator, which is somewhat smaller). The statistically
significant negative coefficients of the non-interacted fiscal capacity indicators obtained with the
HT estimator further suggest that the interaction term coefficients represent a lower bound of
the smoothing effect of fiscal capacity on government financing. The non-linearity of the effect
of fiscal capacity in the size of the NGDP shock is also evident: the smoothing effect of fiscal
capacity increases as the size of the output shock increases. In summary, the countercyclical
effect of fiscal capacity on government financing is clearly visible and very sizable.
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Table 7: Panel estimation for government financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FD FD HT HT
VARIABLES ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 3.169*** 3.657*** 2.649*** 2.802*** 3.030*** 3.549***
(0.786) (0.986) (0.687) (0.768) (0.796) (1.037)
Tax/NGDP -0.592**
(0.252)




∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -40.50*** -27.86*** -41.94***
(13.70) (6.999) (14.71)
Constant 0.147*** 0.154*** 0.0548 0.0577 0.0639 0.0688







∆NGDP*Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 219 219 210 210 219 219
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23
R2 0.253 0.249 0.118 0.115
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-28. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. All changes (∆) are percentage
changes.
6.4 Asymmetry between recessions and expansions
A natural question that arises from the results of the analysis so far is whether the impact of
fiscal capacity on the smoothing of government financing was the same in recessions and expan-
sions. Due to the relatively small number of observations, splitting the sample is potentially
problematic. However, this exercise is important in order to investigate the role of fiscal capacity
in smoothing government financing when this is most needed, namely during recessions.
I define a recession year as one in which the growth in real GDP per capita was zero or
negative, and an expansion year as a one with positive growth. I then let all coefficients vary
between recession and expansion years and present the results in Table 8. In three specifications
out of four, the analysis indicates that the smoothing effect was stronger in recession than
expansion years. In column one, which employs the FE estimator and the Tax/NGDP fiscal
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capacity indicator, for example, the negative coefficient on the interaction between the fiscal
capacity indicator and changes in GDP is larger and more precisely estimated for recession years.
The same is true in columns 2 and 4, where I employ the IncomeTax/NGDP fiscal capacity
indicator and the FE and FD estimators respectively. The only specification in which the result
is reversed and the smoothing effect appears to be stronger and more precisely estimated in
expansion years is column 3, in which I use the Tax/NGDP indicator and the FD estimator.
The reason behind this not completely robust result is probably the small size of the split
sample. In any case, the evidence points more strongly to the smoothing affect being stronger
in recession years. This suggests that fiscally weak countries were unable to counter the collapse
in government financing when they needed it most.
Table 8: Recessions vs expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
Panel A: Expansions
∆NGDP 3.048 2.220 2.409 1.612






∆NGDP 2.721 4.622** 1.391 2.750






Constant 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*Controls 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 219 219 210 210
Number of countries 23 23 23 23
R2 0.267 0.266 0.131 0.127
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. All changes (∆) are percentage
changes. A year is defined as a recession year if ∆GDPPerCapita ≤ 0.
6.5 IV Results
Table 9 and Table 10 feature the panel IV results for tax revenues and government financing
respectively. I run the regressions employing the instruments both one at a time and in con-
junction. In both Tables, columns 1-4 present the FE and FD estimates using the warfare
instrument, columns 5-8 contain the results for the natural disasters instrument and columns
33
9-12 feature the instruments used in conjunction.32 In the two-instrument set-up, I use the
Fuller-k estimator, rather than 2SLS, because of its greater robustness in the presence of weak
instruments and the inclusion of multiple instruments (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Stock
and Yogo, 2005).33
The critical F-stat values for robust estimation for the Fuller-k estimator with two instru-
ments for a maximal 5% and 10% bias over OLS are 15.5 and 12.55 respectively (Stock and
Yogo, 2005). These are met for Tax/NGDP, but weak instruments are a potential issue for the
estimations using the IncomeTax/NGDP fiscal capacity indicator. However, the fact that these
results are very similar to the non-instrumented results is very reassuring.
Table 9 illustrates the usefulness of the IV approach: the coefficients of the interacted fiscal
capacity indicators are smaller than in the standard panel framework, and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero in all specifications except one (FE using natural disasters as instrument).
When I use the instruments in conjunction and the more robust FD estimator, the coefficients
even turn positive (albeit still insignificant). In any case, the general conclusion is that no ro-
bust causal impact of fiscal capacity on tax revenues emerges from the analysis. This indicates
that the IV approach might be correcting a source of bias that links a high tax procyclicality
to low fiscal capacity. A compelling possibility is reverse causality: high tax revenue volatility
might have made investments in fiscal capacity more difficult.
The results in Table 10, instead, are clear-cut, large and highly statistically significant. In
the interwar period, fiscal capacity had a strong smoothing effect on government financing, and
this was evidently due to non-tax revenues. Moreover, this effect was highly non-linear and
increased in magnitude with the size of the economic shock. As I will show below, borrowing is
likely to have played the dominant role in determining this effect.
Three further robust results emerge from the estimation. First, countries with a higher
per capita GDP were able to smooth their government financing more effectively than lower
income countries. Second, countries with more democratic institutions were subject to a higher
volatility in government financing. Third, countries more open to trade smoothed their financing
more. Exploring these results further is beyond the scope of this paper, but one can reasonably
speculate that richer countries found it easier to borrow on financial markets and thus smooth
their revenues, as also confirmed by the analysis in Section 7. More democratic countries,
instead, might have found it more challenging to borrow because of the political constraints and
32In the IV estimations, I use 1914-38 averages as fiscal capacity, rather than the 1914-26 averages used above, in
order to decrease concerns over bias due to weak instruments. The 1914-38 averages have a higher correlation
with the instruments which, incidentally, also supports the idea that fiscal capacity develops gradually over time.
Given that I use instrumental variables, the simultaneity between changes in revenues and capacity which was
concern in the estimations above is no longer an issue. This is as also confirmed by the fact that the estimates
are practically identical qualitatively and quantitatively when the 1914-26 indicators are employed instead.
33The Fuller-k, estimator is inconsistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and many instruments (Hausman,
Lewis, Menzel, and Newey, 2011), and although the many instruments condition is not met in this application, I
perform robustness checks with both the two stage least squares (2SLS) and Continuously Updated Generalized
Method of Moments estimators (CUE). The latter, in particular, is consistent when errors are non-normal in
the presence of many instruments. Both estimators yield very similar results to the Fuller-k. When the equation
is exactly identified (one instrument and one endogenous regressor), all these estimators are equivalent.
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delays involved in a parliamentary budgeting process.34 In the interwar context, less democratic
countries might have also found it easier to engage in financial repression, with the aim of
channeling resources towards government borrowing. This was notoriously the case in Nazi
Germany, for example (Poole, 1939; Childs, 1958).
The third result is more puzzling. Intuition would suggest that more open countries should
be more vulnerable to external shocks and thus more volatile, particularly during the Depres-
sion, which was characterized by a huge contraction in world trade. Rodrik (1998) argues that,
for this reason, countries will increase the size of their government as a form of self insurance.
However, I am controlling for government size, as well as other potential channels behind this
effect, like the level of economic development or the degree of reliance on trade taxes. There-
fore the channel through which openness is so stronlgy correlated with the cyclical volatility of
government financing is, at this stage, unclear. The crucial point, however, is that the effects
of fiscal capacity, economic development, democratic institutions and openness on the smooth-
ing of government financing can all be identified separately, suggesting different underlying
mechanisms.
34Empirical evidence on the link between democracy and fiscal policy procyclicality is mixed. By analyzing
OECD countries, Lane (2003) finds a positive link between the dispersion of political power and fiscal policy
procyclicality, but evidence from a country transitioning from autocracy to democracy – Spain – demonstrates
that the relationship between democratic institutions and the cyclicality of policy is potentially more intricate
(Battilossi, Escario, and Foreman-Peck, 2013).
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Table 9: Panel IV estimation for tax revenues
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue
∆NGDP 1.683 1.776 -0.917 -1.076 2.926*** 3.396*** 1.126 1.445 2.146** 2.281** -0.350 -0.446
(1.055) (1.119) (1.390) (1.676) (0.682) (0.750) (0.980) (0.901) (0.837) (0.888) (1.238) (1.455)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -4.929 6.402 -15.45*** -10.22 -8.843 1.788
(7.831) (10.93) (4.379) (7.374) (5.819) (9.662)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -10.07 13.57 -34.23*** -22.61 -17.61 4.536
(14.58) (25.26) (10.60) (14.18) (10.73) (21.57)
Constant 0.0683** 0.0710* 0.0555 0.0507 0.0647* 0.0659*
(0.0342) (0.0364) (0.0422) (0.0442) (0.0361) (0.0381)
Additional controls
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*Openness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*TradeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 208 208 184 184 208 208 184 184 208 208 184 184
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
R2 0.369 0.375 0.141 0.131 0.347 0.362 0.118 0.134 0.366 0.376 0.142 0.138
Panel B: First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆NGDP*YearsAtWar 0.000616*** 0.000302*** 0.000615*** 0.000290*** 0.000497*** 0.000251*** 0.000532*** 0.00025***
(0.000124) (0.0000963) (0.0000997) (0.0000853) (0.0000662) (0.0000583) (0.0000547) (0.0000559)
∆NGDP*NatDisastNu -0.000244*** -0.000110** -0.000231*** -0.000104** -0.000164*** -0.0000694*** -0.000149*** -0.0000652***
(0.0000741) (0.0000519) (0.0000735) (0.0000501) (0.0000419) (0.0000246) (0.0000364) (0.0000228)
F-Stat 24.58*** 9.79*** 38.12*** 11.58*** 10.88*** 4.52** 9.84*** 4.33** 52.21*** 10.15*** 87.17*** 10.98***
Hansen J-Stat 1.695 2.509 2.776* 2.713*
Endogeneity test 0.001 0.544 0.521 2.931* 4.776** 3.879** 3.748* 1.334 4.256** 1.411 1.013 0.430
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-28. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. All changes (∆) are
percentage changes. Results with more than one instrument are obtained with the Fuller-k estimator, with k = 1. Since errors are clustered at country level, I report
the Kleibergen-Paap first stage F-Statistic.
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Table 10: Panel IV estimation for government financing
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 2.915*** 3.244*** 2.083*** 2.320*** 3.739*** 4.219*** 2.515*** 2.778*** 3.182*** 3.561*** 2.206*** 2.463***
(0.856) (0.988) (0.736) (0.804) (1.188) (1.517) (0.681) (0.803) (0.866) (1.054) (0.688) (0.760)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -15.09*** -9.211*** -22.37** -12.75*** -17.45*** -10.22***
(5.521) (2.952) (10.70) (2.977) (6.451) (2.297)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -31.76** -19.27*** -47.00* -25.74*** -36.72** -21.29***
(13.11) (5.983) (26.63) (8.646) (16.32) (5.558)
Constant -0.00886 -0.00873 -0.00998 -0.00966 -0.00918 -0.00902
(0.0244) (0.0238) (0.0246) (0.0239) (0.0244) (0.0239)
Additional controls
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*Openness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*TradeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 219 219 210 210 219 219 210 210 219 219 210 210
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
R2 0.236 0.232 0.112 0.110 0.215 0.213 0.110 0.107 0.231 0.227 0.112 0.109
Panel B: First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆NGDP*YearsAtWar 0.000661*** 0.000314*** 0.000688*** 0.000329*** 0.000533*** 0.00025*** 0.00055*** 0.000260***
(0.000129) (0.0000984) (0.000103) (0.0000917) (0.0000771) (0.0000586) (0.0000626) (0.0000528)
∆NGDP*NatDisastNu -0.000248*** -0.000118** -0.000269*** -0.000133*** -0.000148*** -0.0000706*** -0.0001407*** -0.0000732***
(0.0000778) (0.0000521) (0.0000714) (0.0000507) (0.0000253) (0.) (0.0000397) (0.0000254)
F-Stat 26.38*** 10.17*** 44.76*** 12.86*** 10.13*** 5.12** 14.17*** 6.87** 57.34*** 11.06*** 113.77*** 15.53***
Hansen J-Stat 0.856 0.955 0.633 0.600
Endogeneity Test 1.598 1.660 0.601 1.385 1.966 1.945 1.619 2.811* 1.426 1.287 0.633 4.283*
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-28. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. All changes (∆) are
percentage changes. Results with more than one instrument are obtained with the Fuller-k estimator, with k = 1. Since errors are clustered at country level, I report
the Kleibergen-Paap first stage F-Statistic.
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6.6 Quantitative impact
This section offers an overview of the economic magnitude of the findings. I first report some
concrete examples of the impact of fiscal capacity under various assumptions. I then offer some
admittedly naive, but suggestive counterfactuals through which I illustrate the path of revenues
over the course of the Great Depression in the United States, by assigning its federal government
different levels of fiscal capacity.
Table 11 presents the summary statistics of the dependent variables and the principal re-
gressors employed in the estimations above. The range of values taken by both sets of variables
is large and offers much scope for investigating the quantitative effects of fiscal capacity on
government financing. For the rest of this section, I consider only negative changes in GDP for
illustrative purposes, but the effects for positive changes are assumed to be symmetric.35
Table 11: Summary statistics of the principal variables
1st Percentile 1st Quartile Mean Median 3rd Quartile 99th Percentile
∆ TaxRevenue -32.8 -3.3 4.9 2.9 8.9 42.2
∆ TaxRevenue (< 0) -41.5 -12.3 -8.8 –5.6 -2.2 -0.2
∆ GovtFinancing -36.1 -4.3 2.3 2.1 8.3 59.7
∆ GovtFinancing (< 0) -37.7 -13.7 -10.1 -7.4 -2.8 -0.1
∆ NGDP -25.6 -3.4 1.3 2.4 6.6 25
∆ NGDP (< 0) -30.5 -11 -7.4 -5.6 -2.2 -0.1
Tax/NGDP (%) 1.5 5.0 6.5 6.2 8.0 14.4
IncomeTax/NGDP (%) 0.2 1.1 2.1 2.0 2.6 8.5
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. The fiscal capacity indicators are 1914-26 averages, while ∆NGDP, ∆
TaxRevenue and ∆ GovtFinancing are for the 1927-38 period.
Table 12 illustrates how the predicted changes in government financing change given different
degrees of fiscal capacity. I use five capacity levels: the smallest found in the sample, the first
quartile, the median, the third quartile and the maximum (see the Table for details). To explore
the non-linearity of the results I also investigate how the results change for different magnitudes
of GDP contractions; I use three values well within the observed range: -5%, -8.5% and -15%.
The results show that, despite the fact that fiscal capacity’s smoothing effect increases with
the size of the income shock, this non-linearity cannot fully compensate the income loss’s effect
on government financing. For the median level of the Tax/NGDP fiscal capacity measure,
moving from a -5%r to a -8.5% loss in NGDP (a 70% larger shock) leads to a 130% larger loss in
revenue. Nonetheless, the quantitatively important impact of fiscal capacity on the smoothing of
government finance is evident. For a -5% income shock, bringing a country from the first quartile
of the capacity distribution to the third, reduces the predicted fall in government financing by
more than 30%. For a -8.5% shock the reduction is 23.3%, and for a -15% shock around 21%.
Given a -5% shock and the largest level of fiscal capacity in the sample, the loss in government
35I investigate the possibility of differential effects of fiscal capacity for negative and positive income shocks in
Appendix A, but the relatively small number of observations when the sample is split between recession and
expansion years makes it difficult to interpret these results with confidence.
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financing could have been rendered practically zero. The results are similar, albeit somewhat
smaller in magnitude, for the IncomeTax/NGDP indicator.
Table 12: Predicted changes in government financing for different levels of fiscal capacity and
changes in NGDP
∆NGDP = −5 ∆NGDP = −8.5 ∆NGDP = −15
Tax/NGDP ̂∆GovtF inancing Tax/NGDP ̂∆GovtF inancing Tax/NGDP ̂∆GovtF inancing
smallest -7.3 smallest -15.2 smallest -29.8
1stquartile -5.3 1stquartile -12 1stquartile -24.2
median -4.7 median -10.8 median -22.1
3rdquartile -3.7 3rdquartile -9.2 3rdquartile -19.2
largest -0.1 largest -3.1 largest -8.6
IncTax/NGDP ̂∆GovtF inancing IncTax/NGDP ̂∆GovtF inancing IncTax/NGDP ̂∆GovtF inancing
smallest -13.5 smallest -23.6 smallest -42.4
1stquartile -12.1 1stquartile -21.3 1stquartile -38.3
median -10.9 median -19.2 median -34.6
3rdquartile -10 3rdquartile -17.6 3rdquartile -31.8
largest -1.4 largest -3 largest -6.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. The coefficients used correspond to the FE estimates. For Tax/NGDP,
smallest = 1.5%, 1stquartile = 5%, median = 6.2%, 3rdquartile = 8% and largest = 14.4%. For IncTax/NGDP,
smallest = 0.2%, 1stquartile = 1.1%, median = 1.9%, 3rdquartile = 2.6% and largest = 5.6%.
Counterfactuals offer an even more straightforward way to grasp the size of the effect of fiscal
capacity on government financing. These compare countries’ predicted government financing
paths based on different fiscal capacity scenarios to their actual paths. The analysis of this
paper is not structural, so fully fledged counterfactuals are simply not obtainable. However,
the examples below are both intuitive and suggestive as to how much the path of government
financing was influenced by the level of fiscal capacity countries possessed on the eve of the
Great Depression.
While going through the counterfactuals, it is useful to recall what the optimal path of fiscal
aggregates over the business cycle would look like according to standard economic theory. Both
in a Keynesian and tax-smoothing framework tax revenues should fall during recessions. In the
tax-smoothing world, tax revenues should not change as a share of GDP over the business cycle,
while in the Keynesian world they can fall further than output to stimulate aggregate demand.
In both cases, this would imply counter-cyclical borrowing to smooth government financing
and fund the acyclical, or counter-cyclical – here the tax-smoothing and Keynesian doctrines
potentially differ again – government expenditure (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; De
Long and Summers, 1986). Recalling a broader view of public revenue and expenditure is
also useful. In countries where states collect little revenues as a share of GDP, sharp falls in
public financing and expenditure can endanger the very ability of states to function. This can
have potentially severe economic and political consequences in both the short and long run. In
summary, the optimal path of government financing should be less procyclical than that of tax
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revenues – or even countercyclical – in order to, at the very least, not exacerbate business cycle
volatility or affect the functioning of the state infrastructure.
I use the example of the United States to provide general intuition (Figure 5). The US
was one of the worst hit countries in the Great Depression, with nominal GDP contracting by
approximately 46% and real GDP per capita by 31% between 1929 and 1933. Government
financing and tax revenues followed a similar path, contracting cumulatively by 47% and 35%
respectively between 1929 and 1933. The path of US government financing was thus markedly
pro-cyclical during the worst years of the Great Depression and non-tax revenues provided no
smoothing. What prevented an outright collapse in spending was an increase in short-term
borrowing, which led to the general fiscal policy stance being essentially neutral. Fiscal deficits
reached less than 6% of GDP by 1933 and were, for the most part, due to the failure to agree
on policies to balance the budget (De Long, 1998).
The New Deal introduced by the newly elected Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 marked a
break in this pattern. A number of new public expenditure programs were implemented to
help combat the Depression. These also paved the way for a dramatic expansion of the Federal
Government, and not just on the expenditure side (Wallis and Weingast, 2005; Fishback and
Wallis, 2013).36 A centralization and expansion in tax revenues – in other words, an increase
of fiscal capacity – accompanied the introduction of new policies on the expenditure side. The
income tax, in particular, was strengthened at both national and state level and became the
main source of tax revenue.37
Given the average response of government financing to changes in NGDP embedded in my
estimates, how different could the path of financing, and therefore fiscal policy, have looked
like during the slump had the US entered the Great Depression with a different level of fiscal
capacity? As a first counterfactual, I assign to the US government in 1927 the fiscal capacity
it had towards the end of my period of analysis, more precisely in 1937, when the drastic
centralization of fiscal resources and expansion in income taxation described above was already
well under way. The result is a significant reduction in the fall of government financing in the
Depression years and a general decrease in its procyclicality. In the second counterfactual, I
transform the US into a fully fiscally centralized country by assigning the fiscal capacity of local
governments (states and municipalities) to the federal government. The result is to further
reduce the cyclical volatility of government financing. The final counterfactual assigns to the
US federal government the fiscal capacity of the United Kingdom, the most fiscally capable
nation in my sample. In this case, government financing becomes markedly counter-cyclical.
Therefore, given even the extremely underwhelming average fiscal policy response to the Great
Depression, my findings indicate that the United States could have been able to run a markedly
less pro-cyclical, and even a counter-cyclical, fiscal policy in the acute Great Depression years
36Some economic programs were funded by national sources and administered by sub-national bodies, while the
national system of defense and old age was run by the central government. National collection and federal
expenditure became standard for education, highways, water and sewage, and public welfare (Wallis, 2000).
37National income tax collection fell in 1929-33, and subsequently rose for the rest of the decade, shooting
up during WWII with the reduction of personal deductions, increases in marginal rates and the beginning of
withholding (Wallis, 2000).
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(a) Dynamics of economic activity and fiscal aggregates
(b) Government financing counterfactuals
Figure 5: US counterfactual, 1927-33
The NGDP, government financing and tax revenues are annual percentage changes. The fiscal balance a share of
GDP is in levels. The counterfactuals are based on results obtained with the FE estimatorand the TAX/NGDP
fiscal capacity indicator
had it possessed a higher level of fiscal capacity on the eve of the slump.
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7 Exploring the channels: fiscal capacity and borrowing
The results of the analysis so far indicate that fiscal capacity affected the revenue smoothing
ability of countries in the interwar period by influencing non-tax revenues. The most natural
candidate for performing this function is borrowing.
Figure 6: Fiscal Capacity and Government Debt, 1927-38
Source: for details on the tax revenue data see B, the debt data is from Papadia (2017); the nominal non-PPP
adjusted GDP data is from Klasing and Milionis (2014)
Figure 6 illustrates the positive relationship between fiscal capacity and borrowing in the
interwar period by presenting the correlation between fiscal capacity (as measured by tax rev-
enue over GDP) and the debt-to-GDP ratio at the central government level for 1927-38. In the
analysis below, I formally test this relationship, finding it to be robust, and also explore the two
principal mechanisms that could explain it. One is that a higher fiscal capacity simply signaled
a higher present value of future tax revenues available for debt repayment. The other is that
fiscal capacity signaled institutional quality and credibility making access to borrowing easier.
The results support the latter. Finally, I show that higher fiscal capacity countries also faced
lower borrowing costs.
7.1 Fiscal capacity and borrowing capacity
I relate fiscal capacity to debt levels through the following basic model:
Debt/NGDPi,t = β0 + β1FiscalCapacityi,t + xi,tγ + εi,t (3)
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which takes the more general form:
Debt/NGDPi,t = β0 + A(`){Debt/NGDPi + FiscalCapacityi + xi}+ ci + lt + εi,t (4)
when dynamics and fixed effects are introduced. A is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator,
` is an aribitrary number of lags, l and c are country and time fixed effects respectively, and ε
is the idiosyncratic error term.
Making the analysis dynamic while controlling for fixed effects is important for several
reasons. First, the debt-to-GDP ratio exhibits persistence; failing to account for this would
lead to miss-specification and bias in the estimates. Second, by introducing lagged terms of
the dependent variable in the model in conjunction with fixed effects, I allow these variables
to interact with each other, reducing the possibility of omitted variable bias. Third, dynamic
estimation using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators allows me to instrument
the regressors with more distant lags of themselves, further reducing the possibility of bias.
Table 13 illustrates the results of the estimation. In columns 1 and 2, the 1927-38 average
debt-to-GDP ratio is regressed against the 1914-26 average fiscal capacity indicators, debt level
and controls. In columns 3-4, I repeat the exercise using annual values of the debt-to-GDP
ratios and fiscal capacity (entered with a lag, as the other controls). Columns 5-8 feature
the dynamic panel estimation in which the debt-to-GDP ratio is regressed on the instrumented
contemporaneous fiscal capacity indicators and controls.38 In the last two columns I also control
for time fixed effects.
I find that, even after controlling for the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio, changes in NGDP, the
structure of tax revenues, economic development (as measured by GDP per capita) and the level
of democracy (as measured by the Polity2 score), as well as country and timed fixed effects,
higher fiscal capacity countries were able and/or willing to borrow more. More precisely, the
results indicate that: 1) high capacity had a larger debt stock, 2) they were able to borrow
relatively more on a yearly basis, 3) debt levels responded dynamically to changes in fiscal
capacity taking place in the interwar years.
In order to identify the channel through which fiscal capacity led to more borrowing, I
proceed with two further steps. The first is to split the debt burden into long-term borrow-
ing and short-term borrowing. This exercise is informative because long-term borrowing and
institutional quality are tightly linked. Long-term borrowing in the interwar period was the
result of a planning and budgeting process, while short-term borrowing was often associated
with emergency funds needed to cover shortfalls in revenues. Moreover, countries normally
accessed long-term borrowing by floating bonds on capital markets, both international and do-
mestic, and thus by submitting themselves to the scrutiny, however imperfect, of underwriters
and lenders. The association between long term borrowing and creditworthiness is still relevant
today: developing countries often choose to borrow short term because it tends to be cheaper,
particularly during crises. This is due to the higher credit risk and uncertainty associated with
long-term investments in counties with weak institutions and volatile macroeconomic funda-
38The effect of the lagged fiscal capacity indicator would be fully captured by lagged debt-to-GDP indicator.
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Table 13: Pooled and dynamic panel estimations for debt-to-GDP ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS DiffGMM DiffGMM DiffGMM DiffGMM
27-38 Debt/NGDP 27-38 Debt/NGDP Debt/NGDP Debt/NGDP Debt/NGDP Debt/NGDP Debt/NGDP Debt/NGDP
14-26 Debt/NGDP 0.605*** 0.534*** 0.722*** 0.641***
(0.173) (0.165) (0.146) (0.155)
L.Debt/NGDP 0.344*** 0.407*** 0.365*** 0.413***













Constant -0.254 -0.785** 0.0130 -0.365**
(0.335) (0.291) (0.189) (0.171)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Openness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TradeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3
Observations 23 23 257 257 248 248 248 248
Number of countries 23 23 28 28 29 29 29 29
R2 0.843 0.859 0.767 0.757
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: columns 1 and 2 contain a cross sectional regression of the 1927-38 debt-to-GDP ratio on 1914-26
average values of the regressors; Columns 3 and 4 are pooled regressions of the annual value of the debt-to-GDP
ratio from 1927 to 1938 on lags of the regressors; columns 5-8 are dynamic panel regressions run for all available
observations between 1914 and 1938. Countries included in columns 1-2: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States;
columns 3-4 additionally feature Brazil, Greece, Ireland, Poland and Romania; columns 5-8 additionally feature
Hungary. For the dynamic panel estimations, I employ the two-step difference GMM estimator exploiting orthog-
onal differences (Arellano and Bover, 1995) rather than first differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) in order to
preserve sample size in the presence of gaps in the data. I employ the difference GMM estimator because, while
the system estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1995) is more efficient, it requires the debt-to-GDP to be stationary.
I insert one lag of the dependent variable as a regressor and use the 3rd lag of the regressors as instrument for
their contemporaneous value. Arellano-Bond and Hansen test confirm the validity of these choices. Standard
errors are clustered at country level in all specifications and small sample adjustments are employed. The results
are robust to different lag structures and instrumenting. See Roodman (2009) for details on the Stata command
used in the estimations. L. stands for lagged. All changes (∆) are percentage changes.
mentals (Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler, 2013).39 The second step is to test whether the
39Another explanation is that short-term borrowing serves as a commitment mechanisms, which disciplines
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source of tax revenues matters. As discussed in detail in Section 2, income taxation is strongly
associated with fiscal capacity whereas a high reliance on trade taxes proxies a low level of fiscal
development. Finding that not only the level, but also composition of revenues mattered would
be a strong indication that the channel through which fiscal capacity influenced the ability to
borrow in the interwar period was institutional quality, rather than simply a higher present
value of future tax receipts.
Table 14 illustrate the results of the estimations. Column 1 and 2 relate long-term bor-
rowing to the two fiscal capacity indicators, while columns 3 and 4 do the same for short-term
borrowing. Columns 5-7 relate the three debt indicators – total, long-term and short-term – to
IncomeTax/NGDP and TradeTax/GDP contemporaneously in order to compare their impact
on borrowing.
The results are clear cut. Columns 1-4 indicate that fiscal capacity, however measured, is
robustly associated with more long-term borrowing. It is also statistically associated with more
short-term borrowing, but the effect for long-term borrowing is 8-10 times larger, confirming
the tight link between this variable and institutional quality. When comparing the impact of
income and trade taxes (columns 5-7), the tight link between total debt, long-term debt and
income taxes emerges clearly once again, whereas trade taxes are only weakly associated with
borrowing: the coefficient is substantially smaller than for income taxes and weakly significant
only for long-term borrowing. In this specification, neither income nor trade taxes are associated
with short-term borrowing. In simple terms, these findings indicate that, in the interwar period,
each unit of income taxes was worth more in terms of borrowing capacity compared to each unit
of trade taxes. Thus, these findings suggest, once again, that fiscal capacity proxies institutional
quality rather than just higher tax receipts.
7.2 Fiscal capacity and borrowing costs
To complete the analysis of the effect of fiscal capacity on borrowing, I turn to analyzing
borrowing costs. The outcome variable is the spread of domestic bond yields over the US
domestic bond yield (see Appendix B for details on this data). The underlying assumption is
that yields reflect the expected probability of default, and that yield spreads reflect the expected
probability of default relative to a baseline bond or country of issue with very low or zero default
risk (Tomz and Wright, 2013).40 The US yield is a natural choice as the baseline because the
country’s economic might and high level of financial development contributed to making it my
samples’ lowest domestic yield for the entire period under consideration (Figure 7).41 The other
countries into following sound policies due to avoid rollover crises, see references in Broner, Lorenzoni, and
Schmukler (2013), page 63)
40Tomz and Wright (2013) also point out some pitfalls of working with bond yields. First, the assumption is that
borrowing takes place in the form of the emission of bonds on competitive markets. this however is not always
the case. Alternative sources of borrowing are banks, although this was uncommon in the interwar period, but
also international organizations and central banks which do not necessarily lend at market rates. Second, not
all sovereign bonds are actively traded on liquid markets.Third, contractual features can vary across countries
and different bond issues, impacting yields.
41See Basile, Landon-Lane, and Rockoff (2010) for a thorough discussion of interest rates in the US in the interwar
period.
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Table 14: Long-term vs short-term borrowing and income vs trade taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DiffGMM DiffGMM DiffGMM DiffGMM DiffGMM DiffGMM DiffGMM
LT Debt/NGDP LT Debt/NGDP ST Debt/NGDP ST Debt/NGDP Debt/NGDP LT Debt/NGDP ST Debt/NGDP
L. LT Debt/NGDP 0.332** 0.439*** 0.525***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.141)






IncomeTax/NGDP 9.012*** 1.112** 7.056** 5.353** 0.696
(2.085) (0.490) (3.251) (2.596) (0.446)
TradeTax/GDP 3.319 3.231* 0.381
(2.080) (1.683) (0.395)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Openness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TradeTaxShare 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 236 236 249 249 248 236 249
Number of countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Countries included are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States; columns 3-4 additionally feature Brazil, Greece, Ireland,
Poland and Romania; columns 5-8 additionally feature Hungary. Regressions run for all available observations
between 1914 and 1938. I employ the two-step difference GMM estimator exploiting orthogonal differences (Arel-
lano and Bover, 1995) rather than first differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) in order to preserve sample size
in the presence of gaps in the data. I insert one lag of the dependent variable as a regressor and use the 3rd
lag of the regressors as instrument for their contemporaneous value. Arellano-Bond and Hansen test confirm the
validity of these choices. Standard errors are clustered at country level in all specifications and small sample
adjustments are employed. The results are robust to different lag structures and instrumenting. See Roodman
(2009) for details on the Stata command used in the estimations. L. stands for lagged. All changes (∆) are
percentage changes. L.y represents the lag of the dependet variable. See Roodman (2009) for details on the Stata
command used in the estimations. L. stands for lagged. All changes (∆) are percentage changes.
fundamental hypothesis of this exercise is that the strength and credibility of fiscal systems
cannot be captured by introducing short-term policy variables, such as budget deficits, as is
commonly done in the literature. I argue, instead, that my fiscal capacity indicators capture the
deeply-rooted characteristics of countries that determine their fiscal development and broader
institutional quality, and are thus the main variables of interest.
I focus on domestic financial markets, for two reasons. The first is that the availability of
data on domestic bond yields is greater. More important, however, is the fact that with the
onset of the Great Depression, which all but froze international financial markets, domestic
credit became the main source of government financing. In fact, the domestic share of debt
for central governments in my sample increased from around 52% in 1927-29 to around 61% in
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Figure 7: Domestic bond yields in selected countries, 1927-38
Yields expressed in percentage points. ARG=Argentina, AUS=Autralia, BRA=Brazil, CZE= Czechoslovakia,
GER=Germany, EGY=Egypt, GBR= United Kingdom, JPN=Japan, POL=Poland, USA=United States of
America. Source: League of Nations (1936/37, 1937/38, 1939/40); see Appendix B for details.
1933-38.42
The estimating equation is as follows:
DomSpreadi,t = β0 + β1FiscalCapacityi,t + xi,tγ + ci + lt + εi,t (5)
where x is a vector of controls, c and l are country and time fixed effects respectively and εi,t is
the idiosyncratic error term.
I run my analysis both by pooling countries on and off the Gold Standard, and by estimating
separate coefficients for the the two. I make this distinction because of the potentially important
role Gold Standard membership had on borrowing costs by acting as a “good housekeeping seal
of approval”.43
42Countries included in this calculation are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, UK, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Japan, Canada, Egypt, New Zealand,
US, South Africa and Spain.
43Bordo and Kydland (1995); Bordo and Rockoff (1996) argue that, during the heyday of the classical Gold
Standard (1870-1913), long-standing adherence to this international monetary system signaled the pursuit of
orthodox policies, which significantly lowered borrowing costs. Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoff (1999) find a
similar effect for countries returning to gold in the 1920s, particularly if this was done at the pre-WWI parity,
which, the authors argue, was a strong signal of financial rectitude. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) confirm these
results of the pre-WWI era, but not for the 1920s, for which they record the rising importance of debt burdens and
British Empire membership. The effect of British Empire membership is another controversial topic. Ferguson
and Schlularick (2006), for example, find that colonies enjoyed lower borrowing costs than non-colonies while
Accominotti, Flandreau, and Rezzik (2011) argue that colonies were structurally different from non-colonies
because of the implicit monitoring by the British government. The authors thus refute the idea of Empire being
a “marginal” effect to be identified though a dummy ceteris paribus. Flandreau and Zumer (2004) and Alquist
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Unlike much of the literature, however, I do not control for Gold Standard adherence using
a simple dummy. This is informed by Accominotti, Flandreau, and Rezzik (2011)’s argument
for British Empire membership before WWI that differences between Empire and non-Empire
countries were structural and cannot be captured by just allowing for a different intercept.
The same is likely for the interwar Gold Standard. Indeed, the coefficient of the Gold Stan-
dard dummy turns out to be statistically indistinguishable from zero whereas, once separate
estimations are run for countries on and off gold, a different pattern emerges.
Shocks to interest rates are likely to have broad based economic repercussions. This gives
the rise to the possibility of feedback effects between the error term and the regressors. For
this reason, I run my analysis using the fixed-effects estimator that is most robust to these:
the first differences (FD) estimator. As long as the error term for the contemporaneous, one
step ahead and one step behind periods is uncorrelated with the regressors, this yields unbiased
estimates.44 Despite potential issues with feedback loops, the inclusion of fixed effects is very
important. Besides reducing the risk of omitted variable bias, these also minimizes issues of
cross-country comparability of the data. Given that the bonds of different countries featured
different contractual characteristics, studying the evolution of bond yields through time offers
a far better indicator of default probabilities than cross-sectional comparisons across countries.
Table 15 presents the results of the analysis. Columns 1-2 illustrate the pooled results,
while columns 3 and 4 distinguish between on gold and off gold countries by allowing their
parameters to be different. The bond yield spread is regressed against the Tax/NGDP and
IncomeTax/NGDP fiscal capacity indicators and a series of controls: the size of the default
and and the debt-to-GDP ratios computed by Papadia (2017),45 the growth rate of nominal
GDP calculated from data provided by Klasing and Milionis (2014), openness as measured by
the share of trade in GDP provided by the same authors, GDP per capita from Bolt and van
Zanden (2013), the Polity2 score and, for pooled regressions, an on gold dummy based on gold
adherence dates summarized by Crafts and Fearon (2013).46
I find that, when countries on and off gold are pooled, a higher fiscal capacity – measured
by the IncomeTax/NGDP indicator – is related to a lower spread (Panel A). The coefficient of
the Tax/NGDP indicator is negative, but not estimated precisely enough to be statistically sig-
nificant. An interesting pattern emerges when coefficients are allowed to vary between countries
on and off gold. For countries on gold (Panel B), these become substantially smaller in absolute
terms for both the Tax/NGD and IncomeTax/NGD indicators and are statistically indistin-
guishable from zero for both. For countries off gold (Panel C), the coefficient for Tax/NGDP is
and Chabot (2011), instead, find that sound policies and common risk factors were more important than Gold
Standard adherence even before WWI.
44The within (FE) estimator, on the other hand, implausibly assumes that the error terms are unrelated with
the regressors at any point within the observation period.
45The default size is the share of the principal of dollar denominated bonds in default over the total principal
dollar-denominated bonds. The measure is developed in the paper as a measure of default size on impact, which
purposely does not take into account ex-post elements such as the final haircut imposed on creditors, which
in most cases of defaults in the interwar period was only finalized after long negotiations, some of which wee
settled only after the end of WWII.
46I consider countries to be off gold if they have officially left the Standard or have introduced exchange controls.
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larger in absolute terms than in the pooled estimation, albeit still insignificant. The coefficient
of the IncomeTax/NGDP indicator, instead, becomes statistically significant once again.
These results indicate that, for countries not on gold, fundamentals such as fiscal capacity
mattered more than for countries still on gold. More precisely, the estimates indicate that
a 1% increase in fiscal capacity led to a 0.23% decrease in the yield spread vis-a-vis the US
on average, and a 0.28% decrease for countries off gold. One can hypothesize that, without
Gold Standard adherence to rely on, the strength of the fiscal system became more important
as a guiding principle for investors. An indication that this is plausible is the fact that, as
the interwar debt crisis unfolded and the Gold Standard disintegrated, rating agency Moody’s
increased the amount of data it supplied in its investment manuals (Moody’s, 1924-37), with tax
revenues being a big part of this.47 This means that, while fiscally stronger countries might have
benefitted from an easier access to borrowing once free of the golden fetters, weaker ones might
have actually experienced an increase in their bond yield spreads. This finding qualifies much
of the literature, which argues that the Gold Standard was the only constraint on countries’
policy responses to the Depression. At least on the fiscal side, my results suggest that leaving
gold had potentially negative repercussions for fiscally weak countries. The quantitative impact
of fiscal capacity is fairly large.
This result also qualifies findings by Bernanke and James (1991) and Bernanke (1995), who
show that economic conditions in countries that left the Gold Standard in 1931 and those that
did not were quite similar, while the recovery was much more robust in leavers. The authors, in
line with Temin (1989) and Eichengreen (1992), attribute this to the policy freedom that leaving
the fixed exchange rate provided (although they stress monetary policy, whereas Eichengreen
also outlined an important role for fiscal policy). The authors dismiss endogeneity concerns
regarding the decision to abandon gold, highlighting that weaker countries should have left the
standard earlier and would have recovered more strongly than those which actually left. This
reasoning, however, rests on the assumption that macroeconomic fundamentals can be captured
by looking at short-term indicators and that leaving the Gold Standard would have had similar
effects in all countries, no matter their institutional characteristics. My findings indicate that,
on the contrary, differences in deeply-rooted fundamentals like fiscal capacity might have led
to asymmetric effects of the decision to abandon the Gold Standard. Therefore, the potential
endogeneity of this decision remerges.
8 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of fiscal capacity on the dynamics of public revenues,
public debt and bond yields in the interwar period. To the best of my knowledge, this is a first.
My findings show that a higher degree of fiscal capacity led to a lower volatility of government
financing in response to economic shocks. The analysis further indicates that fiscal capacity
47The comparison between the wealth of information in pre and post-Depression manuals is substantial and
evident just by visually inspecting the manuals, however I have not carried out a systematic quantitative
assessment of the increase in information supplied through time.
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Table 15: Determinants of domestic government bond yield spreads vis-a-vis the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FD FD FD FD
VARIABLES DomSpread DomSpread DomSpread DomSpread















Constant 0.578 -0.0604 0.129 -0.0865
(0.396) (0.184) (0.224) (0.230)
Additional controls
On Gold 3 3
Default size 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP 3 3 3 3
Debt/NGDP 3 3 3 3
Openness 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3 3 3
Polity2 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 187 176 187 176
Number of countries 25 25 25 25
R2 0.225 0.218 0.240 0.229
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Regression are run for all available observations for 1914-38. Countries
included are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece. Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
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helped to smooth financing by providing an easier access to borrowing for governments, whereas
there is no conclusive evidence of fiscal capacity lowering the volatility of tax revenues. Finally,
the results reveal that how tax revenue was raised mattered. This suggests that fiscal capacity
allowed countries to borrow more extensively by signaling higher institutional quality, rather
than simply a higher present value of future tax receipts.
The findings of this paper speak to three main strands of literature. First, they suggest that
the literature on the Great Depression should take more seriously into account the deep-rooted
constraints under which countries operated when evaluating policy responses to the the slump.
Gold Standard membership did impose a straitjacket on countries, which constrained their
policy choices, but so did historically-determined factors, such as fiscal development. Moreover,
the two might have interacted leading to asymmetric effects of shedding the golden fetters.
Second, the paper illustrates a new channel through which fiscal capacity can affect economic
outcomes besides fostering long-term economic development. I show that fiscal capacity affected
cyclical fiscal outcomes in the interwar period, with deep potential repercussions on both the
short and long-term economic and political health of countries. In countries where financing
volatility led to fiscal crises, which affected the action of states or led to regime changes, long-
term consequences might have been particularly severe. Third, the findings of the paper lend
support to the hypothesis that institutionally determined borrowing constraints can contribute
to fiscal policy pro-cyclicality, and that the size of governments can affect their ability to be a
stabilizing force in the economy.
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Drezè, J., and A. Sen (1989): Hunger and Public Action. Claredon Press.
Ebeke, C., and H. Ehrhart (2011): “Tax Revenue Instability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Con-
sequences and Remedies,” Journal of African Economies, 21(1), 1–27.
Eichengreen, B. (1992): Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-
1939. Oxford University Press.
Epifani, P., and G. Gancia (2009): “Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade,”
Review of Economic Studies, 76, 629–668.
Epstein, S. R. (2000): Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe,
1300-1750. Routeledge.
Esslinger, C., and C. Müller (2015): “State Capacity and Public Debt: A Political Econ-
omy Analysis,” mimeo.
Farquet, C. (2012): “The Rise of the Swiss Tax Heaven in the Interwar Period: An Interna-
tional Comparison,” EHES Working Papers in Economic History, 27.
Fatás, A., and I. Mihov (2001): “Government Size and Automatic Stabilizers: International
and Intranational Evidence,” Journal of International Economics, 55, 3–28.
(2013): “Policy Volatility, Institutions, and Economic Growth,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 95(2), 362–376.
Ferguson, N., and M. Schlularick (2006): “The Empire Effect: the Determinants of
Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880-1913,” Journal of Economic History,
66(2), 283–312.
55
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(1930a): Finanzen und Steuern im In- und Ausland. Hobbing.
(1930b): Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich. Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht.
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A Additional analysis and robustness checks
In this Appendix, I outline some further results, which integrate the analysis in the main body
of the paper. Additionally, I perform a number of robustness checks.
A.1 Revenue elasticity: sensitivity to changing the sample and including
local governments
Table 16 demonstrates that the relationships between economic activity and tax revenues and
economic activity and government financing are very similar to that of 1927-38 if I extend my
analysis to the period1920-1938 and include all available observations. Once again, economic
activity and tax revenues co-move almost 1-to-1, while the coefficient of the change in nominal
GDP is less than half the size when government financing is the outcome variable. When I use
the FD estimator (column 6), the coefficient even becomes statistically insignificant. The results
confirm that non-tax revenues played an important smoothing role in overall public revenue,
and that this effect was consistently present during the whole interwar period.
Table 16: The elasticity of tax revenues and government financing, all observations 1920-38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing
vspace4pt
∆NGDP 1.040*** 0.424*** 1.128*** 0.431*** 1.083*** 0.208
(0.213) (0.120) (0.278) (0.129) (0.355) (0.132)
Constant 0.0473** 0.0332*** 0.0464*** 0.0331*** -0.00235 0.00158
(0.0210) (0.00830) (0.00290) (0.00129) (0.00702) (0.00428)
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 296 452 296 452 243 407
R2 0.052 0.047 0.066 0.051 0.027 0.009
Number of countries 33 35 33 35 33 35
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Countries included in columns 1, 3 and 5 are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia; columns 2,
4 and 6 additionally feature Indonesia, New Zealand, and Uruguay, but exclude Egypt due to data availability.
It is harder to draw inference when I include both central and local governments in the
analysis, because of the small size of the sample. Similarly to Table 4 in the paper, in Table
17), I include only 1927-38 observations that are available for both tax revenues and government
financing. This reduces the sample to 11 countries and 46-35 observations. The results, which
need to be taken with more than a grain of salt, suggest that: 1) total government revenues
were less sensitive to changes in output than central government revenues, 2) the smoothing
effect of non-tax revenues was concentrated at the central level, and ,might have been actually
undone at the local level. The former is demonstrated by the smaller coefficient relating changes
in nominal GDP to both tax revenues and government financing compared to that of central
revenues; the latter is evident in the larger coefficient I find for government financing compared
to tax revenues in two specifications out of three.
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Table 17: The elasticity of central & local tax revenues and government financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆TotTaxRev ∆TotGovFin ∆TotTaxRev ∆TotGovtFin ∆TotTaxRev ∆TotGovtFin
∆NGDP 0.344*** 0.468*** 0.331** 0.330 0.249 0.402*
(0.108) (0.170) (0.114) (0.191) (0.172) (0.226)
Constant 0.00395 0.0233 0.00349 0.0184** -0.0136 -0.0144
(0.0123) (0.0159) (0.00401) (0.00676) (0.0216) (0.0271)
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 46 46 46 46 35 35
R2 0.139 0.124 0.109 0.060 0.033 0.053
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-38. All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Countries included are: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
A.2 Absolute values
As a next step, I reestimate my model using absolute values of the changes in GDP, taxes and
revenues instead of the actual values. This model is closer to estimating whether, on average,
high capacity countries had more or less volatile government financing. This is because the fixed-
effects are not capturing the average effect of unobservables for positive and negative changes
in taxes and financing, but simply their effect on cyclical volatility. I run this model using the
HT approach which allows me to introduce time-invarying regressors, while controlling for fixed
effects. The results are presented in Table 18 and indicate that, consistently with the results so
far, high capacity countries had a lower cyclical volatility in government financing, as evidenced
by the negative and statistically significant coefficients on my two fiscal capacity indicators.
The biggest difference compared to previous estimations, is that the non-linear effect of fiscal
capacity does not emerge in this specification. The coefficients on the interaction between the
indicators and changes in NGDP are positive and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
A.2.1 Instrumenting changes in output
An important robustness check, which I also discuss in the paper, consists in instrumenting
changes in output. I do this similarly to Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) by using changes in output
in trading partners weighted by the corresponding pre-Depression (1926) shares of exports
going to each trading partner (see Appendix B for sources). I not only instrument the fiscal
capacity indicators and the changes in output, but also all the other interaction variables using
the weighted partners output changes interacted with the regressors. Moreover, because of
diminished worries of reversed causality between the outcomes and GDP due to instrumenting,
I also employ government expenditure as an outcome.
Table 19 outlines the result. Not all instruments are very strong, but most pass the threshold
for a maximum bias of 10%.48 The results are overall consistent with the main findings of the
48The exceptions are: 1. in the FE government financing specifications only the changes in NGDP instrument
62
Table 18: Changes in absolute values panel estimation, 1927-38
(1) (2)
HT HT
VARIABLES | ∆GovtF inancing | | ∆GovtF inancing |


















| ∆NGDP ∗ Controls | 3 3
Country FE 3 3
Time FE 3 3
Observations 219 219
Number of countries 23 23
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. All changes (∆) are percentage
changes. All time-varying variables are in absolute values.
paper. For government financing, the difference is that when the FD as opposed to the FE
estimator is used, the coefficient are slightly smaller and the standard errors larger leading to
the coefficient becoming insignificant. This is due to first differencing reducing the variability
in the regressors making the estimation less precise. For expenditure, this is reversed. The FE
coefficients are small in absolute terms and statistically insignificant, while they are large and
strongly significant when the FD estimator is used. This can be explained by the fact that,
when expenditure is the outcome variable, the strict exogeneity assumption required by the FE
estimator is very likely violated. This is because shocks to expenditure contained in the error
term will affect the other regressors, particularly changes in GDP, even of trading partners.
The FD estimator only requires the error term not to be correlated with the regressors in the
contemporaneous period and one period ahead and behind, a much less restrictive assumption.
A.2.2 Further robustness checks
I have carried out a number of further robustness checks, which I do not show because of the
considerable length of this paper. The main result of the paper – the smoothing effect of fiscal
does not pass the threshold; 2. in the FD government financing case, changes in NGDP and the indirect tax
share do not pass the threshold; 3. In the FE expenditure case, only the changes in NGDP instrument doe snot
pass the threshold; 4. in the FD expenditure case, only the indirect tax share does not pass the threshold.
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Table 19: Panel IV estimation instrumenting changes in GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆GovtFin ∆GovtFin ∆GovtFin ∆GovtFin ∆GovtExp ∆GovtExp ∆GovtExp ∆GovtExp
∆NGDP 6.058** 6.660** 5.817* 5.903* 3.565** 3.566** 5.666** 5.933**
(2.375) (2.793) (3.056) (3.337) (1.759) (1.680) (2.497) (2.444)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -22.83* -22.73 -0.700 -15.88***
(11.85) (15.59) (4.998) (5.727)
∆NGDP*IncTax/NGDP -45.52* -37.22 -1.432 -30.56***
(26.21) (27.51) (9.869) (9.284)
Additional controls
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*Openess 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*TradeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 219 219 191 191 205 205 182 182
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
R2 -0.102 -0.095 -0.062 -0.059 -0.195 -0.192 -0.107 -0.083
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1926-38. CUE estimation. All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-38. Countries
included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
capacity for government financing – is robust to using an extended sample (1920-38) and to
using 5 year moving averages for fiscal capacity indicators rather than 1914-26 averages. This
is true for pooled OLS, Panel, IV and Panel IV estimations. As mentioned in the text of the
paper, the inclusion of further controls – such as gold standard membership and the terms of
trade – also do not affect the results.
B Data description and sources
Nominal non-PPP-adjusted GDP (NGDP) and Openness: I use the nominal, non-PPP-
adjusted GDP figures estimated by Klasing and Milionis (2014) for the period 1870-1949. These
are based on Maddison’s GDP estimates and obtained using the so-called “short-cut method”.
This method has a long history; Prados de la Escosura (2000) offers a detailed description.
In essence, it exploits the relationship between PPP adjusted and non-PPP-adjusted GDP
determined by the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods and the relative income level
of the country compared to the benchmark country. In doing this, it makes use of the Balassa-
Samuelson theorem. This data offers clear advantages compared to standard GDP figures in
constructing measures of the debt burden, given that the latter are also in unadjusted nominal
terms. They also capture an important additional feature of the Great Depression besides the
contraction of output: the huge deflation that accompanied it.
Trade openness: Openness figures are from Klasing and Milionis (2014). The authors ob-
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tain the openness figures by combining their estimates of nominal GDP with trade data from
Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009).
Bilateral trade: I use bilateral trade data from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) and
Barbieri and Keshk (2016) in 1926 to calculate the Pre-Depression weights to assign to changes
in output of the trading partners with which I instrument changes on output.
GDP per capita (GDPPC): GDP per capita is taken from the Maddison’s Project’s latest
update (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013), which incorporates the latest available estimates.
Polity2: This is the polity2 score from the POLITY IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).
It is a combined score of autocracy and democracy (both measure between 0 and 10) and is ob-
tained by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy one. The two scores are weighed
indicators of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of
executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.
Central & local debts and debt service: Papadia (2017).
Years at War: these are the years spent fighting major external conflicts by a country in the
period 1816-1913 as reconstructed by Dincecco and Prado (2012) based on Clodfelter (2002)’s
database of major external conflicts in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania
between 1500 and 2000. The variable takes into account the fact that a country might be
involved in more than one conflict per year and can thus exceed 97, as in the case of the United
Kingdom.
Natural Disasters: is from the EM-DAT database of the Centre for the Epidemiology of
Disasters based at the Université Catholique de Louvain (CRED, 2017), which is the most
commonly used sources for studies on natural disasters. The data refers to all natural disasters
to hit countries in the sample between 1900 – the starting state of the database – and 1926 –
the starting date of the analysis. The CRED definition of natural disasters implies one of these
conditions: 1) ≥ 10 casualties, 2) ≥ 100 people affected, 3) declaration of a state of emergency,
4) call for international assistance. I have enquired about the reliability of this data for the
early 20th century directly with CRED. As discussed in the body of the paper, they believe
that the data underestimates the number of disasters, particularly small disasters, in poorer
countries. This indicates that a more accurate reporting would strengthen my results.
Domestic Bond Yields: This data is from various publications of the League of Nations:
League of Nations (1939/40) pages 251-54, Table 117; League of Nations (1937/38), pages 256-
60, Table 131; League of Nations (1936/37), pages 245-59, Table 127. Bond type (coupon %):
Australia Government bonds (4); Austria Government Bonds (miscellaneous) Argentina Gov-
ernment (5); Belgium Government bonds (3); Brazil Government Unified (5); Canada Province
of Ontario; Chile Internal Government (7); China Internal Loans; Colombia Internal Gov-
ernment (7); Czechoslovakia Government Bonds (miscellaneous); Denmark Perpetual Govern-
ment Bonds (3.5); Egypt Government (3.5); Finland State Loans (miscellaneous); France Irre-
deemable Government Bonds (3); Germany Public Bonds (6 until 1935, then 4.5); Greece Refuge
Loan (8); Hungary Forced Loan 1924 (5); India State Loan (4); Italy Government Bond (3.5);
Japan Government Bonds (miscellaneous: average of public bonds); Netherlands Irredeemable
Government bonds (2.5-3); New Zealand Government Bonds (4); Norway Miscellaneous Bonds
(4.5); Poland 1919/20 Dollar Loan (6); Romania Government Bonds (miscellaneous); Spain In-
ternal Debt (4); South Africa Inscribed (5); Sweden Government Bonds (3.25); Switzerland State
and Federal Railways (miscellaneous); United Kingdom Consoles (2.5); United States Treasury
(miscellaneous: average of all outstanding not callable for 12 years or more); Yugoslavia 1921
Loan (7).
Tax revenue categorization: I re-categorize the data in the original sources as follows.
Income (direct) taxes= taxes on income, earnings and capital. Indirect taxes=taxes on capital
transactions and transportation+ taxes on sales+ taxes on consumption; Custom duties; Non
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divisible taxes.
Tax revenues and composition at central and local level: This data from is from vari-
ous publications of the German Imperial Statistical Office, and is complemented by data from
Moody’s investment agency, the League of Nations and Ritschl (2002b). All data is in local
currency. As a general rule, when the sources overlap and disagree, I use data from the later
source. In order to minimize issues of reverse causality, when the fiscal year ends before the
calendar year, I still consider this as a calendar year. For example, if the fiscal year ends in
June 1924, I assign data from July 1923 to June 1924 to the year 1924. This inevitably intro-
duces some noise in the data, but is preferable to increasing the risk of the tax data influencing
the regressors, which would result in including data from 1925 in the 1924 data since higher
frequency data is not available. The data refers to realized revenues rather than budgets. Data
coverage could be expanded by using budgets, but these were notoriously unreliable in the in-
terwar period, especially in poorer countries. The sources with the corresponding page numbers
are: Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a) page 844-847, Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25) page 349,
Statistisches Reichsamt (1930b) Statistisches Reichsamt (1932) page 188*-189*, Statistisches
Reichsamt (1933) page 214*-215*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1934) page 232*-233*, Statistisches
Reichsamt (1936b) page 256*-257*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1937) page 270*-271*, Statistisches
Reichsamt (1938) page 274*-283*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) page 310*-311*, Moody’s
(1933) and League of Nations (1936/37) page 264-273. The country by country breakdown of
the sources is as follows.
Austria: central – 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932), 1931-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937); local (states and local communities) – Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1933), 1931-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Belgium: central – 1913, 1925, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926, 1928-1935 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1937); 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40); local – 1926, 1928-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Bulgaria: central 1914, 1925-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a); 1929-30 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1934-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Czechoslovakia: central – 1926 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a); 1927-28 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932); 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Denmark: central – 1914, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a); 1926, 1928, 1930-34 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1937); 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1926, 1928, 1930-34
Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Estonia: central – 1925, 1927-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934).
Finland: central – 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-29 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932), 1930-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934) , 1934-35
Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
France: central – 1912, 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1932), 1931-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1933-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937),
1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local (departments and municipalities) 1929-30 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1932), 1931-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1933-35 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1937).
Germany: central – revenue only 1921-24 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25) , 1925-29 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1930b), revenue only 1930-38 Ritschl (2002b) Tabelle A.1, composition 1936
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b); local (States, municipalities and hanseatic cities) – revenue
only 1926-38 Ritschl (2002b) Tabelle A.10.
United Kingdom: central – 1914, 1926-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-31 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934),
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1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1938 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1930-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1932-33 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1934), 1934-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Greece: central – 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1931 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933),
1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Hungary: 1913, 1927-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937),
1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local (counties, cities and municipalities) 1929-31 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Ireland: central – 1929-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934),
1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Italy: central – 1914, 1926-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-31 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932), 1932-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1936-37
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local (provinces and municipalities) 1928 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1932) and Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1932-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Latvia: central – 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1927, 1929 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1933); local – 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Lithuania: central – 1925-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b),, 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Netherlands: central – 1913, 1926 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1925, 1927, 1929-34 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1937), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40); local – 1925, 1927, 1929-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Norway: central – 1914, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1937), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40);
local – 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Poland: central – 1925, 1927-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), Poland 1929-30 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1932), 1931-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1937), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local –
1933-34 citetReichsamt37.
Romania: central – 1928 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933),
1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Spain: central – 1914,1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-29 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1933), 1932-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b).
Sweden: central – 1913, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926, 1928-33 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1937), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938),
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1926, 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Switzerland: central – 1913, 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1932), 1931-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1934-1937 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40); local (cantons and municipalities) – 1925-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1931-33
Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Yugoslavia: central – 1929-20 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1931-33 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934).
Argentina: central – 1925-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40).
Bolivia: central – 1925-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1932-35 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938).
Brazil: central – revenue only 1927-29 percentage changes Moody’s (1933), 1930-37 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1939/40).
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Chile: central – 1926-27, 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1931-32 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1934), 1934-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Colombia: central – 1925-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1934-36 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Peru: central – 1925-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1933-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Australia: central – 1914 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926-31 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1938
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Japan: central – 1914.1926-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932),1931-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-36
Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937-38 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Canada: central – 1925-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932), 1931 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935
Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Egypt: central – 1913, 1926-31Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
South Africa: central – 1926-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1937
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
USA: central – 1914, 1926, 1928 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1927 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1937), 1929-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1933
Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Turkey: central – 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932), 1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1935 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
India: central – 1926-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1931 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934),
1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Government financing and expenditure at central and local level: data on government
financing and expenditure also comes from publications of the German Imperial Statistical Of-
fice. All data is in local currency. As discussed in the paper, government financing is a composite
of tax revenues, non-tax revenues and long-term (over 1 year maturity) borrowing, essentially
it is the budgeted part of government revenues. Non-tax revenues include the profits of publicly
owned corporations, public monopolies and unclassified revenues (such as the the sale abroad
of certain commodities). As is the case with most public sector data in the interwar period,
accounting standards tend to differ across countries As for tax revenues, when fiscal years do
not correspond to calendar years I assign data from the year in which the fiscal end to the whole
calendar year and the data all refer to realized revenues rather than budgets. The authors of
the yearbooks made an effort to make the data more easily comparable across countries, but
issues remain (e.g. in Spain short term borrowing cannot be separated out). In the analysis,
the problem is minimized by exploiting the time-series rather that cross sectional variation in
the data. For instances where only some local bodies are included for some years (provinces are
included, but not municipalities), I use the information from years where data is available for all
local bodies to estimate the missing revenue using the average ratio between central and local
revenues. The common sources with page numbers are: Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25) page
126* Statistisches Reichsamt (1935) page 229*-235*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1936b), Statistisches Reichsamt (1938) page 274*-283*, Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40) Statistisches Reichsamt (1941/42). The country by country sources are as follows.
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Austria: central financing & expenditure – 1923-26 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 208,
1927-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937); local financing & expenditure (states and municipalities
with population over 5000)– 1927-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
Belgium: central financing & expenditure – 1912 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1920-33
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 43, 1936 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1938),
1937 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1941/42); local financing & expenditure (provinces
and municipalities) – 1927-32 (municipalities only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1935-36 (mu-
nicipalities only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40), both integrated with proportions between
provinces and municipalities from 1932-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938) .
Bulgaria: central central financing & expenditure – 1920–33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a)
page 55, 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local financing & expenditure (departments
and municipalities) – 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938).
Czechoslovakia: central financing & expenditure – 1925-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b),
1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937); local financing & expenditure – states and municipali-
ties 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), only states 1935-38 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Denmark: central financing & expenditure – 1912-13 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1920-
33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 63, 1936 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1938),
1938 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing & expenditure (munici-
palities) – 1920-27 estimate based on proportion between central and local in 1928-33 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1935), 1934-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Estonia: central financing & expenditure – 1926-27, 1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1928–
32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1937-38 (revenue only)
Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local financing & expenditure – 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1935).
Finland: central financing & expenditure – 1911-13 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1920-33
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 84, 1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1936 (revenue
only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 (revenue only)Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); lo-
cal financing & expenditure (cities and rural municipalities) – 1925-31 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936a), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1933-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
France: central financing & expenditure – 1911-13, 1920 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25),
1921-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 95, 1937 (revenues only) Statistisches Reich-
samt (1941/42); local financing & expenditure (departments) – 1920-30 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936a) page 96, 1934 (revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Germany: central & expenditure – 1925 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1926-38 Ritschl
(2002b); local financing & expenditure (states and municipalities) – 1926-34 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936a) page 18.
United Kingdom: financing & expenditure – 1912-14 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1921-26
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 124, 1927-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1938 (rev-
enue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing & expenditure (England and Wales
only) – 1921-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a), 1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1936
(revenues only), 1937-38 (expenditure only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Greece: central financing & expenditure – 1928-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1935-36
(revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1938 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40); local financing & expenditure – 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1937-38
(revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Hungary: central financing & expenditure – 1925-26 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 305,
1927-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1938 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Ireland: central financing & expenditure – 1922-34, 1935-36 (revenue only) Statistisches Reich-
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samt (1936a), page 140, 1935 (expenditure only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1938 (revenue
only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing & expenditure (municipalities) – 1929-
33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
Italy: central financing & expenditure – 1912-14 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1921-34
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 145 1936-38 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local financ-
ing & expenditure (municipalities) – 1928 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1935 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1938).
Latvia: central financing & expenditure – 1927, 1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1928-33
Statistisches Reichsamt (1935); local financing & expenditure – 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1935), 1935-37 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938)
Lithuania: central financing & expenditure – 1926, 1932-1936 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1937), 1937 (revenues only) 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local financing & expen-
diture – 1927-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
Netherlands: central financing & expenditure – 1911-13 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25),
1920-25 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 185, 1926-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1937
(revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1941/42); local financing & expenditure (provinces
and municipalities) – 1927-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1933-35 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938).
Norway: central financing & expenditure – 1921-26 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 198,
1927-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937). 1936 (revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1938);
local financing & expenditure (municipalities) – 1925-31 (revenues) Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936a),1928-31 (expenditure), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1934-36 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1938).
Poland: central financing & expenditure – 1922-31 (revenues) 1922-28 (expenditure) Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 222, 1932-37 (revenues) 1929-37 (expenditure) Statistisches
Reichsamt (1937); local financing & expenditure (municipalities) – 1928-34 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1935), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Romania: central financing & expenditure – 1926-31, 1933-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Spain: central financing & expenditure – 1927-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1935 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1936b); local financing & expenditure – 1927-31 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1935).
Sweden: central financing & expenditure – 1911-13 (revenues) 1911-12 (expenditure) Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1920-26 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 261, 1927-34, 1936
Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b); local financing & expen-
diture – 1921-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Switzerland: central financing & expenditure – 1911-1913 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25),
1920-25 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 273, 1926-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937) ex-
cept revenue 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local financing & expenditure – 1920-33
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a).
Yugoslavia: central – financing & expenditure 1928-32 (revenue) 1928-33 (expenditure) Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1935), 1933-38 (revenue) 1934-38 (expenditure) South-Eastern European
Monetary Network (2014); local financing & expenditure – 1929-33 (revenue) 1928-33 (expen-
diture) Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Argentina: central financing & expenditure – 1920-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 416,
1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Bolivia: central financing & expenditure – 1920-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 424.
Brazil: central financing & expenditure – 1920-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 427,
1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937); local financing &
expenditure (states) – 1920-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a).
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Chile: central financing & expenditure – 1927-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1937 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing & expenditure – 1929-33 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1935).
Colombia: central financing & expenditure – 1920-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 466,
1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing & expenditure – 1927-33 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1936a).
Peru: central financing & expenditure – 1920-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 482,
1935-36 (revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40), 1937 (revenues only) Statistisches
Reichsamt (1941/42).
Uruguay: central financing & expenditure – 1923-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 490,
1935-36 (revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Australia: central financing & expenditure – 1912-14 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1921-
25 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 526, 1926-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b). 1937-38
(revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing & expenditure (states and
municipalities) – 1921-34 (municipalities), 1937-38 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40), both in-
tegrated with 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935) to calculate states and municipalities.
New Zealand: central financing & expenditure – 1920-26, 1928-34 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936a) page 536, 1938 (revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Japan: central financing & expenditure – 1911-13 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1921-34
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 377-78, 1935 (revenues) Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b),
1936 (revenues) Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937) ; local
financing & expenditure – 1921-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 377-78.
Indonesia: central financing & expenditure – 1920-33 (1932 and 1933 are budget figures) Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 389.
Canada: central financing & expenditure – 1912-14Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1921-34
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 454, 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1936 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1937), 1937 (revenues only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing
& expenditure (provinces and municipalities) – 1920-33 (provinces only) Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936a) integrated with 1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
Egypt: local financing & expenditure – 1937-38 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
South Africa: central financing & expenditure – 1926-27, 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b),
1928-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1937 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1941/42); local financing & expenditure (provinces and municipalities) – 1928-32
Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
USA: central financing & expenditure – 1912-14, 1921-24 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25),
1926-27, 1933 (revenues), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1928-32 (revenues) 1928-34
(expenditure) Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1934 (revenues) 1936 (expenditure), 1937 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1937), 1936, 1938 (revenues) Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local financing
& expenditure (states) – 1928-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
Turkey: central financing & expenditure – 1926-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1928-33
(revenues), 1928-32 (expenditure) Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1934-36 (revenues) 1933-36
(expenditure) Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local fi-
nancing & expenditure (villages and municipalities) – 1928-31Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
India: central financing & expenditure – 1926-27, 1933-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b),
1928-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1937-38 (revenues
only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local financing & expenditure – 1928-32 (provinces,
districts, local corporations and cities), 1933-34 (provinces) Statistisches Reichsamt (1935),1935
(provinces), 1936 (provinces and municipalities), 1937 (provinces) (revenues only) Statistisches
Reichsamt (1939/40).
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